A14095:1029
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Again, to do good to the poor, is not good in it self (as you suppose,) we were wont to say in the University, that Omnis actio est bona aut mala propter circumstantias; and as I remember, it was a saying of Bernard, that vain-glory clotheth ⟨p. 434⟩the poor as well as charity. And how can that be a good will to the poor, that practiseth to cozen others for the gratifying of the poor? •o may he be said to bear a good will to Paul, that robbeth Peter to pay Paul; yet that which he will leth is good to Paul, I confess, but it is no good will to him that is such a pay master; neither is it necessary it should proceed from any intention to satisfy Paul; it may well proceed from other intentions. No man is bound in conscience to hinder any mans welfare, or his own either, no nor the glory of God by ungodly courses; no nor doth the obligation rest in general, but it concludes in special, all good courses that lie in his power: so to tender it, a man is bound and not otherwise. You have discoursed of divers enormities, in the close you open the cause of them unto us, and of many other like and that you say is the infinite capacity of finite existence: this you say is the cause, not why such enormities are, but of the possibility of them. Now the possibility of such enormities is all one with the possibility of sin and transgression. Therefore the infinite capacity of finite existence is the cause why sin is possible. I thought it had been satisfaction enough in this point, to conceive, that because we are in subjection to a Lord, who can give us a law, and are free agents, therefore we may either obey a law given unto us, or transgress it. And because, look what is the cause why disobedience is possible, the same is the cause why obedience also is possible. It followeth, that the cause why obedience is possible, must be the infinite capacity of finite existence. And because by finite existence you mean a reasonable creature, your meaning a little more plain is this, The reason why a man may sin, or abstain from sin, is his infinite capacity. We say, it is the liberty of his will, being in subjection to a law which you cannot deny, nor any sober man: herehence it followeth, that this infinite capacity you cant of, is but the liberty of mans will in subjection to the law of a superior Lord.
Againe, to doe good to the poore, is not good in it selfe (as you suppose,) we were wont to say in the Vniversity, that Omnis actio est bona aut mala propter circumstantias; and as I remember, it was a saying of Bernard, that vaine-glory clotheth