A14095:1058
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Again, what justice do you devise in God towards his creature? Both Vasquez and Suarez concur in this, that the ⟨p. 453⟩justice of God towards man doth always presuppose his will, and God may bind himself as he pleaseth by promise. But Gods will (you say) is not the rule of goodness, because the designs thereof are backed with infinite power. Your theme was to prove, that Gods will is not the rule of goodness, when you come to prove it, you prove nothing less, but only that the cause why Gods will is not the rule of goodness, is not, for that his designs are backed with infinite power. This is not to disprove Gods will to be the rule of goodness, but rather to confirm it, for, in saying that this or that is not the cause why Gods will is the rule of goodness, you do imply, that you maintain, that his will is the rule of goodness, though not for this cause. Perhaps you may say, They which maintain Gods will to be the rule of Gods goodness, do maintain it upon no other ground then this, to wit, Because his designs are backed with infinite power.
Againe, what justice doe you devise in God towards his creature? Both Vasquez and Suarez concurre in this, that the ⟨p. 453⟩justice of God towards man doth alwaies presuppose his will, and God may binde himselfe as he pleaseth by promise. But Gods will (you say) is not the rule of goodnesse, because the designes thereof are backt with infinite power. Your theame was to prove, that Gods will is not the rule of goodnesse, when you come to prove it, you prove nothing lesse, but onely that the cause why Gods will is not the rule of goodnesse, is not, for that his designes are backt with infinite power. This is not to disprove Gods will to be the rule of goodnesse, but rather to confirme it, for, in saying that this or that is not the cause why Gods will is the rule of goodnesse, you doe imply, that you maintaine, that his will is the rule of goodnesse, though not for this cause. Perhaps you may say, They which maintaine Gods will to be the rule of Gods goodnesse, doe maintaine it upon no other ground then this, to wit, Because his designes are backt with infinite power.