A14095:1059
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But had it been so, you might have fallen directly upon the overthrowing of such a foundation, without carrying it in such a manner as if you would bear the world in hand, that your self in some sort hold Gods will to be the rule of goodness, whereas you mean nothing less; and therefore in carrying your discourse after this manner, you betray a faint heart in maintaining the main. Secondly, I say it is incredible that any should maintain Gods will to be the rule of goodness, for this cause, because his designs are backed with infinite power, as much as to say, because God can do what he will. This reason carieth no colour of truth with it; for there is no reason why amongst men, they that can do what they will in comparison to other men, should therefore be honester men then other. But because God hath infinite lawful power, that extends to every thing that implies no contradiction, hence it followeth, that whatsoever God doth is good; and whatsoever God can do, if it were done by him, it should justly be done, otherwise he should have power to be unjust; which power (in this case) should either be in vain, because it is not possible that ever it should be actuated, or if actuated, God should be unjust. Holiness (you say) doth so ⟨p. 454⟩rule his power and moderate his will, that the one cannot enjoin, or the other exact any thing, not most consonant to the eternal or abstract patterns of equity. You take great liberty of discourse throughout. What I pray, according to our understandings is the subject of Gods holiness? is it not his will? And how can his holiness work upon his will? Doth the heat of fire work upon the fire? or the cold of water work upon the water? Again, here we have power and will distinguished, and the act of enjoining attributed to the one, and exacting to the other. Both are acts of command: now I pray consider, doth Gods power command? I had thought imperium had been the proper prerogative of the will, yet both these, by your discourse, are in subjection to the eternal patterns of equity; and equity before you confounded with justice. Now I know no such justice in God, different from his wisdom. And herein I am of the same mind with Aquinas, Quest. 23. De voluntate Dei, Art. 6. where he disputeth this question, Utrum justitia in rebus creatis ex simplici divina voluntate dependeat.
But had it beene so, you might have fallen directly upon the overthrowing of such a foundation, without carrying it in such a manner as if you would beare the world in hand, that your selfe in some sort hold Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse, whereas you mean nothing lesse; and therefore in carying your discourse after this manner, you betray a faint heart in maintaining the maine. Secondly, I say it is incredible that any should maintaine Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse, for this cause, because his designes are backt with infinite power, as much as to say, because God can doe what hee will. This reason carieth no colour of truth with it; for there is no reason why amongst men, they that can doe what they will in comparison to other men, should therefore bee honester men then other. But because God hath infinite lawfull power, that extends to every thing that implies no contradiction, hence it followeth, that whatsoever God doth is good; and whatsoever God can doe, if it were done by him, it should justly be done, otherwise hee should have power to be unjust; which power (in this case) should either be in vain, because it is not possible that ever it should be actuated, or if actuated, God should be unjust. Holinesse (you say) doth so