A14095:1068
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Yet your instance is more extravagant then your assertion, as when you add, God might, had it pleased him, have taken life and existence from all mankind, when he preserved Noah and his family. But to reserve them men, and no reasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent. So God did reserve divers beasts at that time also; but to reserve them beasts, and not unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent; as much as to say, to reserve reasonable creatures, no reasonable creatures, and to reserve unreasonable creatures no unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent. For certainly God cannot make contradictories to be true: as for the same creature to be both reasonable and unreasonable. And call you this the objective goodness of a thing possible? or is this your definition of goodness, to imply no contradiction. Then let evil be goodness, and injustice goodness, and darkness light, Belial an honest man. For certainly not one of these apart doth imply any contradiction. Your exposition of this is as bad as any of the rest. When we say things implying contradiction cannot have any being, we understand it of things containing divers notions, which notions are contradictory one to another: not that they are contradictory to the nature and essential goodness of God, as you expound it. For that which is continual, to consist of points indivisible, we hold to be contradictions: so did Aristotle: as also that a body existent should be infinite; or that motion properly so called should be in an instant. But neither Aristotle, nor any of his Peripatetics, that I know, did ever maintain, that the contradiction here spoken of, consisted in this, that the thing stood in contradiction to the nature or essential goodness of God; more then in contradiction to the ⟨p. 462⟩nature and essence of an Angel, or to the nature and essence of a man.
Yet your instance is more extravagant then your assertion, as when you adde, God might, had it pleased him, have taken life and existence from all mankinde, when he preserved Noah and his family. But to reserve them men, and no reasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent. So God did reserve divers beasts at that time also; but to reserve them beasts, and not unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent; as much as to say, to reserve reasonable creatures, no reasonable creatures, and to reserve unreasonable creatures no unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent. For certainly God cannot make contradictories to be true: as for the same creature to be both reasonable and unreasonable. And call you this the objective goodnesse of a thing possible? or is this your definition of goodnesse, to imply no contradiction. Then let evill be goodnesse, and injustice goodnesse, and darknesse light, Belial an honest man. For certainly not one of these apart doth imply any contradiction. Your exposition of this is as bad as any of the rest. When we say things implying contradiction cannot have any being, wee understand it of things containing divers notions, which notions are contradictory one to another: not that they are contradictory to the nature and essentiall goodnesse of God, as you expound it. For that which is continuall, to consist of points indivisible, we hold to be contradictions: so did Aristotle: as also that a body existent should be infinite; or that motion properly so called should be in an instant. But neither Aristotle, nor any of his Peripatetickes, that I know, did ever maintaine, that the contradiction here spoken of, consisted in this, that the thing stood in contradiction to the nature or essentiall goodnesse of God; more then in contradiction to the