A14095:115
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
If you frame your argument in another fashion to help this, as thus; What hindereth Gods life from being his power, and wisdom &c. I answer that the formal notions of these is sufficient to hinder it, except you can give some better reason to the contrary, then hitherto you have done. A second incongruity I find in your discourse and that is this. That question, the decision whereof you meditate in this chapter, arose from that which formerly you maintained; that all things were in God, in a kind of Ideal, and transcendental manner, now your self have confessed that Ideas were of substances, if not only of them. For your words are these, If Plato meant that there were as many several Ideas eternally extant, whether in the first cause of things, or without him, as there were substances specifically distinct, &c. But here you give instance only in such things as are of accidental notion and denomination with us, such as are life, and power, and wisdom, and goodness. Lastly, I have already showed that this argument of yours is not sound, whereby you prove Gods being to be illimited, because forsooth it is independent: As if this consequence were evident of it self, whereas on the contrary, all Philosophy is against it. For Aristotle maintained the World to be independent; all others maintained the matter whereof the world was made to be independent: Yet none conceived, that herehence it would follow, that either of them was therefore illimited, or at all illimited. That Gods attributes are not really distinguished, we all confess, you need not have brought in Austins authority to justify this. But you take upon you to confront Atheists by evidence of demonstration wherein you fail very much. For it will not follow, that if these attributes be distinct among themselves, or from the essence of God, then the Divine essence is limited. Like as on the contrary, it will not follow, that if the essence of something be limited, the attributes thereof must needs be distinct from the essence. For the soul of man is limited, yet some have maintained that the faculties of the soul are ⟨p. 75⟩not really distinct from the essence of the soul, as Scotus, & that by shrewd arguments. And Zabarell professeth, that Intellectus practicus is all one with Voluntas.
If you frame your argument in another fashion to helpe this, as thus; What hindereth Gods life from being his power, and wisedome &c. I answere that the formall notions of these is sufficient to hinder it, except you can give some better reason to the contrary, then hitherto you have done. A second incongruitie I finde in your discourse and that is this. That question, the decision wherof you meditate in this chapter, arose from that which formerly you maynteyned; that all thinges were in God, in a kinde of Ideall, and transcendentall manner, nowe your selfe have confessed that Ideaes were of substances, if not only of them. For your wordes are these, If Plato meant that there were as many severall Ideaes eternally extant, whether in the first cause of thinges, or without him, as there were substances specifically distinct, &c. But here you give instance only in such thinges as are of accidentall notion and denomination with us, such as are life, and power, and wisedome, and goodnes. Lastly, I have allready shewed that this argument of yours is not sounde, wherby you proove Gods being to be illimited, because forsoothe it is independant: As if this consequence were evident of it selfe, wheras on the contrary, all Philosophy is against it. For Aristotle maynteyned the World to be independent; all others maynteyned the matter wherof the world was made to be independent: Yet none conceaved, that herehence it woulde followe, that eyther of them was therfore illimited, or at all illimited. That Gods attributes are not really distinguished, we all confesse, you neede not have brought in Austins authoritie to justify this. But you take upon you to confront Atheists by evidence of demonstration wherin you fayle very much. For it will not followe, that if these attributes be distinct among themselves, or from the essence of God, then the Divine essence is limited. Like as on the contrary, it will not followe, that if the essence of something be limited, the attributes therof must needes be distinct from the essence. For the soule of man is limited, yet some have maynteyned that the faculties of the soule are