A14095:116
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And all beit the power of God be distinct from the wisdom of God, yet if both be acknowledged to be infinite, each in his kind, what prejudice is this to the infiniteness of Gods essence? Neither will it follow, that one attribute shall want so much of infinite being in his kind, as another hath of proper being distinct from it; considering that these notions are of different kinds. As for example, if a body, as put the case, the outward heaven, were infinite, there should be both infinite length, and infinite breadth, and infinite thickness, neither's infiniteness being any whit prejudicial to the infiniteness of the other, because they are of different kinds. And what colour of reason have you, why infiniteness of power should prejudice the infiniteness of wisdom, though they were distinct really, which yet we believe they are not. And what think you, if some attributes be found answerable to personal distinctions in the Trinity? Is it not commonly said that the second person in Trinity is the wisdom of the Father, and cometh from the Father per modum intellectus; and that the H. Ghost proceedeth from both per modum voluntatis? But I have no edge to look into the Ark, or suffer my disputation to trench upon these mysteries. Yet I confess, though the Father be not the Son, nor the H Ghost, &c. Yet they are not really distinct one from the other. In the Trinity there is alius & alius, not aliud & aliud. But you maintain that Gods power is his wisdom, &c. which yet notwithstanding I mislike not, but only do question the argument, whereby you endeavour to prove it, and to my judgement it seems very superficial. But my comfort is this, if you weakly maintain the nature of God, you will as weakly oppose the grace of God. Again I say, it will not follow, that if the several beings of wisdom and power were distinct, and not identically the same with the essence of God, then the essence should not be infinite. For it may be said that the essence is infinite in a being substantial; the power and wisdom ⟨p. 76⟩of God are infinite in a being accidental, though such as necessarily flows from the nature of God. Indeed if it were proved, that there is no accident in God, then the case were clear, that these attributes were not distinct from the essence of God, as indeed they are not;
And all beit the power of God be distinct from the wisedome of God, yet if bothe be acknowledged to be infinite, each in his kinde, what prejudice is this to the infinitenes of Gods essence? Neyther will it followe, that one attribute shall want so much of infinite beinge in his kinde, as another hathe of proper being distinct from it; consideringe that these notions are of different kindes. As for example, if a body, as put the case, the outward heaven, were infinite, there shoulde be bothe infinite lengthe, and infinite breadthe, and infinite thicknes, neythers infinitenes being any whit prejudiciall to the infinitenes of the other, because they are of different kindes. And what colour of reason have you, why infinitenes of power should prejudice the infinitenes of wisedome, thoughe they were distinct really, which yet we believe they are not. And what thinke you, if some attributes be founde answerable to personall distinctions in the Trinity? Is it not commonly sayde that the second person in Trinity is the wisedome of the Father, and commethe from the Father per modum intellectus; and that the H. Ghost proceedeth from bothe per modum voluntatis? But I have no edge to looke into the Arke, or suffer my disputation to trenche upon these mysteries. Yet I confesse, thoughe the Father be not the Sonne, nor the H Ghost, &c. Yet they are not really distinct one from the other. In the Trinity there is alius & alius, not aliud & aliud. But you maynteyne that Gods power is his wisedome, &c. which yet notwithstanding I mislke not, but only doe question the argument, wherby you endeavour to proove it, and to my judgement it seemes very superficiall. But my comfort is this, if you weakely maynteyne the nature of God, you will as weakely oppose the grace of God. Agayne I say, it will not followe, that if the severall beings of wisedome and power were distinct, and not identically the same with the essence of God, then the essence should not be infinite. For it may be sayde that the essence is infinite in a beinge substantiall; the power and wisedome