A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…

And in this chapter do undertake to show, that all things thus being in God, are not in him by way of plurality, but drawn to unity: and accordingly should hereby prove, that the essence of an Angel, and the essence of a man, yea and the essence of a beast, and of every base thing is so in God, as one with him, and one with every thing: You shift of from this, and in the place thereof, only mention, how Gods life, and wisdom, and power, and goodness are all one in God. And this you prove only from this, that God is illimited; which is as sorry a consequence as that, whereby you proved his illimited condition, to wit from this, that he is independent, and received not his being from any thing. Which consequence of yours, is so far from natural evidence, that it is repugnant to all Philosophers of old, who maintained either the World, or the first matter (not to speak of Intelligences) to be independent of any efficient cause, and without all making, yet did never conceive that herehence it must follow, that either of them should be infinite. No less inconsequent is that, which followeth also, as when you say, Wheresoever it can be truly said, this is one and that another, or this is, and is not that, each hath distinct limits. I say this is untrue. For suppose a body were infinite; In this case both length, and breadth, and thickness were infinite; yet length were only length, and not ⟨p. 79⟩breadth, yet never a whit the less infinite. Neither is infinity in thickness any hinderance to infinity in breadth, though breadth be not thickness; nor infinity in breadth, any hinderance to infinity in length, though length be not breadth. In like sort the infinity of Gods power should be no prejudice to the infinity of his wisdom, though his wisdom be not his power; Nor the infinity of his goodness, any prejudice to the infinity of his power, and wisdom, though his power, and wisdom, and goodness were different in themselves. But to come nearer; what think you of the Persons in the Trinity? The Father is the Father, and neither is he the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; will you herehence conclude that he is not infinite? The Son is the Son, but he is neither the Father nor the Holy Ghost; will you therefore say, he is not infinite?

And in this chapter doe undertake to shewe, that all things thus being in God, are not in him by way of pluralitie, but drawne to unitie: and accordingly should herby proove, that the essence of an Angell, and the essence of a man, yea and the essence of a beast, and of every base thing is so in God, as one with him, and one with every thinge: You shift of from this, and in the place therof, only mention, how Gods life, and wisedome, and power, and goodnes are all one in God. And this you proove only from this, that God is illimited; which is as sory a consequence as that, wherby you prooved his illimited condition, to witt from this, that he is independent, and receaved not his being from any thinge. Which consequence of yours, is so farre from naturall evidence, that it is repugnant to all Philosophers of olde, who maynteyned eyther the World, or the first matter (not to speake of Intelligences) to be independent of any efficient cause, and without all makinge, yet did never conceave that herehence it must followe, that eyther of them should be infinite. No lesse inconsequent is that, which followeth allso, as when you say, Whersoever it can be truly sayde, this is one and that another, or this is, and is not that, each hath distinct limits. I say this is untrue. For suppose a body were infinite; In this case bothe lengthe, and bredthe, and thicknes were infinite; yet lengthe were only lengthe, and not