A14095:1214
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
6 Here you proceed learnedly to distinguish between somethings determined by oath, and somethings else, and in the accommodation of your distinction, you tell us, that Voluntas signi, and beneplaciti, can have no place in things determined ⟨p. 544⟩by divine oath, but well it may in other things. What is the other member of your distinction opposite to things determined by divine oath, you express not, but leave to your reader to conjecture. Now because usually when oaths are spoken of by way of distinction, the opposition is made between oaths and bare words, therefore we conceive your distinction completely delivered to run thus. Some things are determined by Gods oath; other things are determined by Gods bare words. Now this distinction I take to be neither accurate according to the form, nor sound in the matter thereof.
6 Here you proceede learnedly to distinguish betweene somethings determined by oath, and somethings else, and in the accomodation of your distinction, you tell us, that Voluntas signi, and beneplaciti, can have no place in things determined ⟨p. 544⟩by divine oath, but well it may in other things. What is the other member of your distinction opposite to things determined by divine oath, you expresse not, but leave to your reader to conjecture. Now because usually when oathes are spoken of by way of distinction, the opposition is made betweene oathes and bare words, therefore wee conceive your distinction completely delivered to runne thus. Some things are determined by Gods oath; other things are determined by Gods bare words. Now this distinction I take to be neither accurate according to the forme, nor sound in the matter thereof.
As touching the form. It is not right to say things are determined either by Gods oath, or by his word, but rather by his will. For determination is the act of Gods will. Words and oaths are but the signification and outward protestation of the determination of his will. Then as for the matter, I see no cause but that by what reason soever the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti, hath course in the one, by the same reason it may have course in the other also. For Gods word undoubtedly is as certain as his oath; albeit in condescending to our infirmity he is pleased to protest in solemn manner, and by oath, for the strengthening of our faith. We commonly say that an honest mans word is as good as his oath to bind him. Certainly as God cannot break his oath, so is he [Greek or Hebrew], a God that cannot lye, and his will