Again, herehence it followeth, that whosoever do extend this maxim so far as naturally it would reach, they shall not be apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, nor be touched with ignorance in assoiling them. For the truth whereof I appeal to every mans conscience that reads your writings: of whom I am persuaded not one of a thousand, if Scholars, doth deny but that this Maxim holds universally; yet you take upon you to give a reason why we extend it not so far as naturally it would reach, and that you say is our proneness to extend our own power to the utmost, even farther then true goodness can accompany it. So then the honester men are, the more apt they are to extend this Maxim to the utmost, and consequently less apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, and less ignorant to assoil ⟨p. 590⟩them: and the reason why men do conceive difficulties in your writings, or are not able to assoil them, is for want of honesty. And you in the mean time would not be supposed to show any want either of wit or honesty in your discourses. Well, this article of your natural Creed is observable, They that do things unjustifiable, they do not extend this Maxim (Both parts of contradiction cannot be true) so far as naturally it would reach, which is a mystery unto me, and whereof I can devise no reason, neither do you give any. For although our natures are humorous, unconstant, and we find contradiction, and are enraged with contradiction, and arm power against that which doth contradict us, yet herehence it followeth not that we limit or restrain the rules of contradiction; unless out of some such curious sophistry and subtlety as this, you dispute in this manner; We oppose them that contradict us, therefore we do restrain the rules of contradiction: I doubt my reader would scarce think me sober, if I should go about to dissolve this sophistry; yet the face of your discourse looks no other way then this. And I confess the law of God, and rules of good manners shall never fail to contradict him that is of a dishonest disposition. And though passions turn commonly into their contraries, yet notwithstanding all such inconstancy, true morality will always be an opposite to him that is dishonest. But yet I find no propension herehence to maintain, that both parts of contradiction are true, or both false.
Againe, herehence it followeth, that whosoever doe extend this maxime so farre as naturally it would reach, they shall not be apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, nor be touched with ignorance in assoiling them. For the truth whereof I appeale to every mans conscience that reades your writings: of whom I am perswaded not one of a thousand, if Schollers, doth deny but that this Maxime holds universally; yet you take upon you to give a reason why we extend it not so farre as naturally it would reach, and that you say is our proneness to extend our owne power to the utmost, even farther then true goodnesse can accompany it. So then the honester men are, the more apt they are to extend this Maxime to the utmost, and consequently lesse apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, and lesse ignorant to assoile ⟨p. 590⟩them: and the reason why men doe conceive difficulties in your writings, or are not able to assoile them, is for want of honestie. And you in the meane time would not be supposed to shew any want either of wit or honestie in your discourses. Well, this article of your naturall Creed is observable, They that doe things unjustifiable, they doe not extend this Maxime (Both parts of contradiction cannot be true) so farre as naturally it would reach, which is a mysterie unto me, and whereof I can devise no reason, neither doe you give any. For although our natures are humorous, unconstant, and wee finde contradiction, and are enraged with contradiction, and arme power against that which doth contradict us, yet herehence it followeth not that we limit or restraine the rules of contradiction; unlesse out of some such curious sophistrie and subtiltie as this, you dispute in this manner; We oppose them that contradict us, therefore we doe restraine the rules of contradiction: I doubt my reader would scarce thinke me sober, if I should goe about to dissolve this sophistry; yet the face of your discourse lookes no other way then this. And I confesse the law of God, and rules of good manners shall never faile to contradict him that is of a dishonest disposition. And though passions turne commonly into their contraries, yet notwithstanding all such inconstancy, true morality will alwaies be an opposite to him that is dishonest. But yet I finde no propension herehence to maintain, that both parts of contradiction are true, or both false.