A14095:1311
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
As in other parts so in this it may be your purpose was to write Quodlibets: well, such as they are, I purpose to consider them as I find them. To sum up the particulars; in the first place you discover unto us the causes of conceiving difficulties, and of ignorance in assoiling them, and that is because ⟨p. 586⟩we extend this Maxim, (Both parts of contradictories cannot be true,) not so far as we should, and the reason thereof is (you say) because we extend our power to the utmost, yea farther then justice or goodness can accompany it: To this you add […] our nature is humorous and inconstant, and therefore nothing can imply any constant contradiction to our nature, and that look what is constant and still the same, that will at one time or other contradict our humour. And humours, you say, enraged with contradiction arm power against whatsoever contradicts them.
As in other parts so in this it may be your purpose was to write Quodlibets: well, such as they are, I purpose to consider them as I finde them. To summe up the particulars; in the first place you discover unto us the causes of conceiving difficulties, and of ignorance in assoiling them, and that is because ⟨p. 586⟩we extend this Maxime, (Both parts of contradictories cannot bee true,) not so farre as we should, and the reason thereof is (you say) because we extend our power to the utmost, yea farther then justice or goodnesse can accompany it: To this you adde 〈…〉 our nature is humourous and inconstant, and therefore nothing can imply any constant contradiction to our nature, and that looke what is constant and still the same, that will at one time or other contradict our humour. And humours, you say, enraged with contradiction arme power against whatsoever contradicts them.
By the way you tell us, that the use of power in creatures sensitive is to satiate their appetite of sense; in man, to accomplish his will and desire of good. And that being corrupt, his power becomes an under-commander unto his unruly appetites, as in voluptuous men; and that in men esteemed good, motions of equity are so weak, that men yield their consents to such proposals, as were they firm, they would offensively contradict them. And the reason why they yield, is lest upstart appetites, which custom countenanceth, should be enlarged by reluctance: But love, you say, is not alike set on divers objects, but divides itself unequally, when it comes to opposition between sense & reason; our selves and friends or common equity: And the inconveniences whereto the world and flesh exposeth us are reducible to two heads, the blinding of the judgement, and consequently the abusing of power and authority.