A14095:1315
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Again, herehence it followeth, that whosoever do extend this maxim so far as naturally it would reach, they shall not be apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, nor be touched with ignorance in assoiling them. For the truth whereof I appeal to every mans conscience that reads your writings: of whom I am persuaded not one of a thousand, if Scholars, doth deny but that this Maxim holds universally; yet you take upon you to give a reason why we extend it not so far as naturally it would reach, and that you say is our proneness to extend our own power to the utmost, even farther then true goodness can accompany it. So then the honester men are, the more apt they are to extend this Maxim to the utmost, and consequently less apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, and less ignorant to assoil ⟨p. 590⟩them: and the reason why men do conceive difficulties in your writings, or are not able to assoil them, is for want of honesty. And you in the mean time would not be supposed to show any want either of wit or honesty in your discourses. Well, this article of your natural Creed is observable, They that do things unjustifiable, they do not extend this Maxim (Both parts of contradiction cannot be true) so far as naturally it would reach, which is a mystery unto me, and whereof I can devise no reason, neither do you give any. For although our natures are humorous, unconstant, and we find contradiction, and are enraged with contradiction, and arm power against that which doth contradict us, yet herehence it followeth not that we limit or restrain the rules of contradiction; unless out of some such curious sophistry and subtlety as this, you dispute in this manner; We oppose them that contradict us, therefore we do restrain the rules of contradiction: I doubt my reader would scarce think me sober, if I should go about to dissolve this sophistry; yet the face of your discourse looks no other way then this. And I confess the law of God, and rules of good manners shall never fail to contradict him that is of a dishonest disposition. And though passions turn commonly into their contraries, yet notwithstanding all such inconstancy, true morality will always be an opposite to him that is dishonest. But yet I find no propension herehence to maintain, that both parts of contradiction are true, or both false.
Againe, herehence it followeth, that whosoever doe extend this maxime so farre as naturally it would reach, they shall not be apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, nor be touched with ignorance in assoiling them. For the truth whereof I appeale to every mans conscience that reades your writings: of whom I am perswaded not one of a thousand, if Schollers, doth deny but that this Maxime holds universally; yet you take upon you to give a reason why we extend it not so farre as naturally it would reach, and that you say is our proneness to extend our owne power to the utmost, even farther then true goodnesse can accompany it. So then the honester men are, the more apt they are to extend this Maxime to the utmost, and consequently lesse apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, and lesse ignorant to assoile