A14095:1338
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Arminius confesseth, that the most innocent creature God 1can annihilate without prejudice to his justice, yea to inflict the torments of hell upon such a creature. Medina maintains, that God as Creator hath such power over his creature, Ex […] omnium Theologorum sententia: yet do we distinguish between potentia absoluta, and potentia ordinata; God can do that by power absolute, which he cannot do on supposition that he will not do it: for that were to change, and that were impotency, rather then power. And to speak in proper terms; It is not fit to say that God cannot do this because he will not; for there is no consequence in this, either in respect of God or man: Such a one will not do this or that; therefore he cannot do it.
Arminius confesseth, that the most innocent creature God 1can annihilate without prejudice to his justice, yea to inflict the torments of hell upon such a creature. Medina maintaines, that God as Creator hath such power over his creature, Ex 〈…〉 omnium Theologorum sententia: yet doe wee distinguish betweene potentia absoluta, and potentia ordinata; God can doe that by power absolute, which he cannot doe on supposition that he will not doe it: for that were to change, and that were impotency, rather then power. And to speake in proper termes; It is not fit to say that God cannot doe this because he will not; for there is no consequence in this, either in respect of God or man: Such a one will not doe this or that; therefore he cannot doe it.
- 1Exam. praedest. Perk. p. 107. In 12. q. 87. art. 8.
But supposing Gods will to do this or that, tis more proper to say, that upon this supposition, it is impossible God should do otherwise, because it is impossible he should change his will. For there are but two causes of the change of the creatures will and resolution, the one fickleness of the will, the other improvidence of the understanding, in not foreseeing all that might come to pass. But neither of these is possibly incident unto God. So then if God hath promised ought, tis unpossible that it should not be performed, or that God should prove untrue. If God loves a man, tis as much as to say, he is determined to doc him good, and tis impossible it should be otherwise then he hath determined. But to say that God in point of justice cannot perform that, without performing whereof he shall be untrue, is a paradox of paradoxes. For if in performing it he shall be true, then in not performing of it he shall be untrue. And doth Gods justice bind him to be untrue? you might as well say, it binds him to be unjust.