A14095:1359
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Now I demand whether this free abstinence from some evils, be of grace or no? If of grace, whether this grace be not a fruit of mercy? If so, then it appears that before we abstain from any evil, we are capable of mercy, thereby to obtain grace, to abstain from evil.
Now I demand whether this free abstinence from some evills, be of grace or no? If of grace, whether this grace be not a fruite of mercie? If so, then it appeares that before we abstaine from any evill, wee are capable of mercy, thereby to obtaine grace, to abstaine from evill.
I know no state that makes a man uncapable of mercy in this life, but only the state of sinning against the holy Ghost. I do not like your distinction of doing good, and doing it naughtily; for, whatsoever we do naughtily, therein we cannot be said to do good, but evil rather: for therein we sin, and in sinning we do not any good, but evil rather. Yet I confess, we may be said to do good imperfectly, but not naughtily in my judgement. Though we do both less evil, and the good that we do less naughtily then possibly we might do, God still you say diminisheth the riches of his bounty towards us. I profess at first sight, I took this to be a notorious untruth, but when I considered a claw of your sentence, which is this, less evil then possibly we might do. I reverse my judgement, and find it to be a most vulgar and despicable conceit, though in the way of truth. For the contrary proposition to your supposition is a thing impossible. For how is it possible that a man can do at once all the evil that he can do? Now if he doth not do all the evil that possibly he can do, there is some comfort in your paramutheticall contemplations, and he need not fear lest God proceed to diminish the riches of his bounty towards him. And so might the Sodomites comfort themselves at the worst, for certainly they had not done all the evil that possibly they might do. Now it was well ⟨p. 610⟩worth the having, to hear you explain unto us, what you understand by the influence of Gods gracious providence, which you say God restrains, and by restraining suffers men to fall from one wickedness to another, suffering the reins of our unruly appetites to be given into our uieldie hands. Here be good phrases, which if you would be pleased to interpret unto us in plain terms, I doubt not but we should find good matter to work upon.