A14095:138
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
You tell us, that our imaginations will hardly suffer infinity to be severed from time and place. This is a paradox to me. I had thought rather, it had been far […] for us to imagine time finite, and place finite, then either of them infinite. For it is a ruled case, that infinitum qua infinitum non potest cognosci; Yet you will have it so easy to be imagined, 1as that you make it a very difficult matter for imagination to apprehend either time or place otherwise then infinite. If you had avouched it of time and place indefinite, it had been less distant from the truth; yet that also distant from the truth. For undoubtedly my imagination may conceive a time definite, as well as indefinite; As for example, it may as well conceive three years space of time, as well as more years space of time then three, without de•ing how much: the like may be said of place also. As for infinite time and place, as it is impossible that any such thing should be, so I promise you, I cannot conceive that it should be so easily (as you suppose) if possibly imagined. Yet you take ⟨p. 89⟩upon you to give a reason of so uncouth an assertion. But that proof is as inconsequent, as your former assertion was insolent. For though sensible things cannot easily be separated in our understanding from place and time, yet when herehence you infer, that place it self cannot be separated by the understanding from the immensity thereof, nor time it self from the eternity thereof, I find neither art in this consequence, nor any tolerable colour or show of reason to make it probable. And to the contrary (as I said) It is a ruled case that infinitum qua infinitum non potest cognosci. And therefore it is so easy a thing to separate infinity from time & place; as it is impossible, that in the understanding of man it should be conjoined with them. Yet this is not all the error of this your discourse. For the Antecedent is utterly untrue: as when you say, that sensible things when they are winnowed from the rest into the closet of the understanding, they still retain their circumstances of time and place. Whereas to the contrary it is undoubtedly true, that Intelloctus abstrahit ab hic & nunc; the understanding considereth things abstract from time and place; and so doth the imagination also:
You tell us, that our imaginations will hardly suffer infinitie to be severed from time and place. This is a paradoxe to me. I had thought rather, it had bene farre for us to imagine time finite, and place finite, then eyther of them infinite. For it is a ruled case, that infinitum qua infinitum non potest cognosci; Yet you will have it so easy to be imagined,