A14095:152
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And it is a truth; for Chimeras may be conceived, and Tragolaphoi, and Centaurs, and after a sort privations and negations also, which yet are no real thing. But we cannot rightly conceive (you say) that nothing should have any degree or kind of being. And I say, that neither is any such conceit requisite to maintain, that nothing may have just right and title to be termed it selse. And yet by your leave, if it were possible that God should have no being, then this proposition Nihilest, were possible to be true, and not otherwise. Now in maintaining this proposition you have proceeded so far, as to affirm that nothing hath neither beginning nor end of days, and that therein it is most unlike unto God in respect of his eternity. Want of being, you say, is the worst kind of barrenness. But is it not more sober to affirm, that want of being is no kind of barrenness at all. For barrenness implies being. And why should you put your self to such pains of phrasifyinge, in proving that nothing cannot bring forth any rank of being? since no such thing is needful to this, to wit, that nothing may have right or title to be termed it self; taking it as an affirmative ⟨p. 103⟩proposition, wherein nothing is the subject, not as a negative, wherein the word nothing is only a sign of an Universal negative. For in this latter acception, it is utterly untrue, seeing every thing may be termed it self, as in saying a man is a man, and so is a mouse a mouse; and so the negation of all things (which is your own description of the word nothing) is also, it self, to wit, the negation of all things. And so it is true to affirme that nihil est nihil.
And it is a truthe; for Chimeraes may be conceaved, and Tragolaphoi, and Centaures, and after a sort privations and negations allso, which yet are no reall thinge. But we cannot rightly conceave (you say) that nothing shoulde have any degree or kinde of beinge. And I say, that neyther is any such conceyte requisite to maynteyne, that nothing may have just right and title to be termed it selse. And yet by your leave, if it were possible that God should have no beinge, then this proposition Nihilest, were possible to be true, and not otherwise. Now in maynteyninge this proposition you have proceeded so farre, as to affirme that nothing hathe neyther beginninge nor ende of dayes, and that therein it is most unlike unto God in respect of his eternitie. Want of being, you say, is the worst kinde of barrennes. But is it not more sober to affirme, that want of being is no kinde of barrennes at all. For barrennes implyes beinge. And why shoulde you put your selfe to such paynes of phrasifyinge, in proovinge that nothing cannot bring foorth any ranke of being? since no such thing is needefull to this, to witt, that nothing may have right or title to be termed it selfe; taking it as an affirmative