A14095:1600
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
How Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy or other affections are in the divine nature.
II is true some Schoolmen think that distributive justice may be properly enough attributed unto God but not commutative; not because this includes rationem dati & accepti, but rather because it includes, aequalitatem dati & accepti. Yet others are of opinion that justice distributive can be attributed unto God with no greater propriety, then justice commutative: as may be seen in Vasque 1. in 1. part. disput. 86. Likewise I know none, that think, mercy is more properly to be attributed unto God then anger. For voluntas vindicandi as properly and formally belongs to God, as voluntas miserandi: that being as easily abstracted from grief, as this from compassion.
II is true some Schoolemen thinke that distributive justice may be properly enough attributed unto God but not commutative; not because this includes rationem dati & accepti, but rather because it includes, aequalitatem dati & accepti. Yet others are of opinion that justice distributive can be attributed unto God with no greater propriety, then justice commutative: as may be seene in Vasque 1. in 1. part. disput. 86. Likewise I know none, that thinke, mercy is more properly to be attributed unto God then anger. For voluntas vindicandi as properly and formally belongs to God, as voluntas miserandi: that being as easily abstracted from greife, as this from compassion.
As for revenge there is no colour why that should not in greatest propriety be attributed unto God like as also reward. To say that affections or moral qualities may be contained in the divine essence eminently, is a very poor justification of them to be the attributes of God. For to be eminently in God is no more (as your self heretofore have explicated it chap. 4. sect. 2.) then God to be the Author of them, and produce them. Now in this sense you may attribute the name of any body or beast unto God, and say God is such, or such a thing is God, to wit eminently. But who can doubt but voluntas miserandi and voluntas vindicandi are in God not eminently but formally. Yet notwithstanding the very will of God is infinitely different from the will of man. No passion, as a passion is in God though that name which signifieth a passion in man, may be truly verified of Gods signifying the nature of God in a certain reference unto his creatures without all passion.