A14095:1602
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
As for revenge there is no colour why that should not in greatest propriety be attributed unto God like as also reward. To say that affections or moral qualities may be contained in the divine essence eminently, is a very poor justification of them to be the attributes of God. For to be eminently in God is no more (as your self heretofore have explicated it chap. 4. sect. 2.) then God to be the Author of them, and produce them. Now in this sense you may attribute the name of any body or beast unto God, and say God is such, or such a thing is God, to wit eminently. But who can doubt but voluntas miserandi and voluntas vindicandi are in God not eminently but formally. Yet notwithstanding the very will of God is infinitely different from the will of man. No passion, as a passion is in God though that name which signifieth a passion in man, may be truly verified of Gods signifying the nature of God in a certain reference unto his creatures without all passion.
As for revenge there is no colour why that should not in greatest propriety be attributed unto God like as also reward. To say that affections or morall qualities may be contayned in the divine essence eminently, is a very poore justification of them to be the attributes of God. For to be eminently in God is no more (as your selfe heretofore have explicated it chap. 4. sect. 2.) then God to be the Author of them, and produce them. Now in this sense you may attribute the name of any body or beast unto God, and say God is such, or such a thing is God, to wit eminently. But who can doubt but voluntas miserandi and voluntas vindicandi are in God not eminently but formally. Yet notwithstanding the very will of God is infinitly different from the will of man. No passion, as a passion is in God though that name which signifieth a passion in man, may be truely verified of Gods signifying the nature of God in a certayne reference unto his creatures without all passion.
So there is a will and understanding in God, but nothing like to the will and understanding of man: For will and understanding in man are accidents they are not so in God. Our anger at the best, as being displeased only with such things that displease God, though in some little thing it be like Gods anger; yet in many things it is very unlike: For it is a passion in us, not in God, it riseth in us which before was not no such innovation in God. Gods anger is vindicative ours ought not to be so, but only in case we are his ministers. For vengeance is mine I will repay saith the Lord. I cannot justify you in so speaking, when you say that mercy is more real, and truly affectionate in God then his anger; For taking them sequestered from their imperfections, each is formally attributed unto God, though not as passions, and not eminently only as you have delivered it.