A14095:1628
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And do you think any man doubts whether that fitness, which is measured by incomparable fitness, should be better then that which is measured and ordered by any inferior measure of fitness? And what is all this, if we speak plainly, but to say, that rewards of obedience, and punishment of disobedience are so well fitted, as they cannot be amended. And ⟨p. 708⟩this plain and vulgar truth is expressed in terms as obscure as those Paracelsus was wont to discourse in. Not only rewards and punishments which are chiefly reserved for another world, but every thing in this world we believe to be so ordered, that the wits of men and Angels were not able to mend it.
And doe you thinke any man doubts whether that fitnesse, which is measured by incomparable fitnesse, should be better then that which is measured and ordered by any inferiour measure of fitnesse? And what is all this, if we speake plainly, but to say, that rewards of obedience, and punishment of disobedience are so well fitted, as they cannot be amended. And ⟨p. 708⟩this plain and vulgar truth is expressed in termes as obscure as those Paracelsus was wont to discourse in. Not only rewards and punishments which are cheifly reserved for another world, but every thing in this world we beleive to be so ordered, that the wits of men and Angells were not able to mende it.
But yet whether the infinite wisdom of God might not exceed this, the Schoolmen in their disputation hereupon, as I remember do generally deny. He is eminently all, in as much as he produceth all; but you may be pleased to except relations, such as contrariety and equality. For they are not termini producibiles but such as do usually result upon position of their foundation. When you say, As of his other attributes one truly and really is an other, so in respect of man his measure is his judgement, &c. You seem to reckon amongst the attributes of God a strange one, which you call his measure; and this you say is not only the rule whereby he rewards or punisheth, but the reward and punishment it self. Rewarding and punishing are kinds of Gods working. Now if we would know by what rule God works, the Apostle plainly informs us herein, when he saith, God worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will.