A14095:21
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
For what do you mean by liberty of doing good, & liberty of doing evil? is it quoad specisicationem? or only quoad exercitium? dare you profess that God is free to do evil, as well as good? or that Man since his fall, & in the state of nature is free to do good as well as evil? quoad exercitium we grant that both God is free to do or not do, whatsoever he doth; & soe likewise Man is free to do or not do, whatsoever he doth. Why do you take such pleasure in confounding things that differ, at least in not distinguishing them? Yet this is not all the confusion we complain of. For Gods absolute power is one thing, his ordinate power is another thing, for this includes his will. God could have refused to make the world, when he did make it, & he made it freely; but supposing Gods decree to make it, & to make it at that time it was impossible it should be otherwise, as it is impossible that Gods will should be changed. In like sort, God doth all this time continue the World, & he continueth it freely. But yet in respect ⟨p. 6⟩of his decree to continue it certain years it is impossible, upon this supposition, that it should end before the time appointed. Again, what mean you to feign any such Tenet, on our parts in opposition to Arminius, as that God for soothe hath soe decreed all things, that nothing can fall out otherwise then it hath done? For we expressly to the contrary maintain, that God hath decreed many things to come to pass in such sort, that they could have fallen out otherwise, to wit all such things as are contingent. For we do not maintain that God hath decreed, that all things shall come to pass necessarily; but some things only necessarily, & other things contingently. And in respect of these modi rerum in general, which are necessity contingency, we say it is impossible that any thing should come to pass otherwise, then God hath decreed they shall come to pass, in this sense: to wit, if God hath decreed some things to come to pass necessarily, they shall come to pass necessarily; if he hath decreed some things to come to pass contingently, they shall come to pass contingently, & it is impossible, that things should come to pass otherwise.
For what doe you meane by libertie of doing good, & liberty of doing evill? is it quoad specisicationem? or only quoad exercitium? dare you professe that God is free to doe evill, as well as good? or that Man since his fall, & in the state of nature is free to doe good as well as evill? quoad exercitium we grant that both God is free to doe or not doe, whatsoever he dothe; & soe likewise Man is free to doe or not doe, whatsoever he dothe. Why doe you take such pleasure in confounding things that differ, at least in not distinguishing them? Yet this is not all the confusion we complayne of. For Gods absolute power is one thinge, his ordinate power is another thing, for this includs his will. God coulde have refused to make the world, when he did make it, & he made it freely; but supposing Gods decree to make it, & to make it at that time it was impossible it should be otherwise, as it is impossible that Gods will shoulde be changed. In like sort, God dothe al this time continne the World, & he continueth it freely. But yet in respect