A14095:223
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And is this a proper course, to run out to the imagination of things impossible to represent God by? For whereto tendeth this, but to conceive him infinite, first by way of extension, which is quite contrary to spiritual perfection, and secondly after such a manner as is utterly impossible to be. Yet such courses, all they must needs take, that seek out to satisfy imagination. For imaginatio as we commonly say in Schooles non transcendit continuum. You proceed to show how Gods immensely hath no diversity of parts; and your argument intends to draw to an inconvenience as many as maintain the contrary. But the inconvenience which you infer depends only upon peradventure thus. A concurrence of all parts in number infinite, would perhaps be impossible; why then perhaps it would not be impossible; and what then shall become of your argument. Besides this; the whole frame of your argument is unsound. For infinite natures, such as man is, there is no necessity of the concurrence of all parts to the performing of all actions, no nor to the performing of any action. As for example if he gives himself to study and meditate, there is no necessary use of other then of the inward faculties of his mind. If he playeth upon the Lute, there is no use of his legs and feet. If he fighteth with his enemies, there is no use of his tongue or teethe, nor so much use of his legs as of his hands, though sometimes one pair of legs is better then two pair of hands, yet not to fight, but to run away rather; though [Greek or Hebrew], as Demosthenes sometimes said, being put to his wits to save the credit of his courage. Indeed if God were not as he is, he could not be so omnipotent as he is, we need no pains at all to prove this.
And is this a proper course, to runne out to the imagination of thinges impossible to represent God by? For wherto tendeth this, but to conceave him infinite, first by way of extension, which is quite contrary to spirituall perfection, and secondly after such a manner as is utterly impossible to be. Yet such courses, all they must needes take, that seeke out to satisfie imagination. For imaginatio as we commonly say in Schooles non transcendit continuum. You proceede to shewe how Gods immens•ie hathe no diversitie of parts; and your argument intends to drawe to an inconvenience as many as maynteyne the contrary. But the inconvenience which you inferre depends only upon peradventure thus. A concurrence of all parts in number infinite, would perhaps be impossible; why then perhaps it would not be impossible; and what then shall become of your argument. Besides this; the whole frame of your argument is unsound. For infinite natures, such as man is, there is no necessitie of the concurrence of all parts to the performing of all actions, no nor to the performing of any action. As for example if he gives himselfe to study and meditate, there is no necessary use of other then of the inward faculties of his minde. If he playeth upon the Lute, there is no use of his legges and feete. If he fighteth with his enemies, there is no use of his tongue or teethe, nor so much use of his legges as of his handes, thoughe sometimes one payre of leggs is better then two payre of handes, yet not to fight, but to runne away rather; thoughe , as Demosthenes sometimes sayde, being put to his witts to save the credite of his courage. Indeede if God were not as he is, he coulde not be so omnipotent as he is, we neede no paynes at all to proove this.