A14095:254
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Much less is this capacity a part, whereof man doth consist. For every Philosopher knows that the capacity of the ⟨p. 142⟩matter belongs to that principium generationis which is called privatio. Now Privatio, though it be principium generationis as well as Materia & forma; yet is it not principium compositi. Ex tribus principiis Homo generatur? ex duobus tertiu companitur? But perhaps you speak not of the capacity of the matter to receive a form, which is proper only to compound substances; But of the possibility of Being, before they are, which is extended even to Angels. But then I say much less is the nature of man to be said, composed of such a capacity; for this capacity is not so much as potentia physica, but a only potentia logica, to wit, negatio repugnantia, as when we say 'twas possible the world should be, before it was, for it implies no contradiction: For Gods almighty power was able to make it out of nothing. So it was possible that Angels should be before they were. In like sort it was possible, that man should be, before he was. But neither man nor Angels can be said to be composed of such a possibility; or of such a capacity, for that were to say that a real & positive thing is composed of that which is neither real nor positive. And it is impossible that a thing not real or positive should be a part of that which is real & positive. But yet, you may say; All created things consist ex potentia & actu, be they never so simple and uncompound, as the very Angels themselves, God alone is Actus purus void of all passive power. But as touching this power by your leave, I take it not to be spoken in respect of the potentiality going before the Act, which you say is actuated, but rather in respect of a potentiality consequent to the Act, or concomitant with it, as we conceive it of such a nature as may cease to be, or be destroyed.
Much lesse is this capacity a part, whereof man doth consist. For every Philosopher knowes that the capacity of the ⟨p. 142⟩matter belongs to that principium generationis which is called privatio. Now Privatio, though it be principium generationis as well as Materia & forma; yet is it not principium compositi. Ex tribus principiis Homo generatur? ex duobus tertiu companitur? But perhaps you speake not of the capacity of the matter to receave a forme, which is proper only to compound substances; But of the possibility of Being, before they are, which is extended euen to Angells. But then I say much lesse is the nature of man to be sayd, composed of such a capacity; for this capacity is not so much as potentia physica, but a onely potentia logica, to witt, negatio repugnantia, as when we say 'twas possible the world should be, before it was, for it implyes no contradiction: For Gods almighty power was able to make it out of nothing. So it was possible that Angells should be before they were. In like sort it was possible, that man should be, before he was. But neyther man nor Angells can be sayd to be composed of such a possibility; or of such a capacity, for that were to say that a reall & positive thing is composed of that which is neyther reall nor positive. And it is impossible that a thing not reall or positive should be a part of that which is reall & positive. But yet, you may say; All created things consist ex potentia & actu, be they never so simple and uncompound, as the very Angells themselves, God alone is Actus purus voyd of all passive power. But as touching this power by your leave, I take it not to be spoken inrespect of the potentiallity going before the Act, which you saye is actuated, but rather in respect of a potentiallity consequent to the Act, or concomitant with it, as we conceave it of such a nature as may cease to be, or be destroyed.