A14095:255
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Or last of all, it may proceed in respect of the distinction between essence and existence, which is found in all things beside God himself: In which respect they are said to consist ex potentia et Actu, which kind of composition, as I remember, is called Metaphysica; and it extends to all created things in distinction from all other compositions whatsoever, which are peculiar to some more then to others. But in what congruity this capacity may be said to be filled, when essence is ⟨p. 143⟩actuated by existence, I comprehend not. For to be filled, presupposeth the existence of that which is to be filled. And existence seems rather to contain essence, then essence, existence. But most paradoxical of all is it, that existence should be composed of capacity, and the actuation or filling of it: Whereas existence, in my judgement, is rather the actuation formal of essence, then is composed thereof.
Or last of all, it may proceed in respect of the distinction between essence and existence, which is found in all things beside God himselfe: In which respect they are sayd to consist ex potentia et Actu, which kind of composition, as I remember, is called Metaphysica; and it extends to all created things in distinction from all other compositions whatsoever, which are peculiar to some more then to others. But in what congruity this capacity may be sayd to be filled, when essence is ⟨p. 143⟩actuated by existence, I comprehend not. For to be filled, presupposeth the existence of that which is to be filled. And existence seemes rather to conteyne essence, then essence, existence. But most paradoxicall of all is it, that existence should be composed of capacity, and the actuatiō or filling of it: Whereas existence, in my judgement, is rather the actuation formall of essence, then is composed thereof.
In the next place you tell us, that life (especially sensitive) is but the motion or progress of this capacity towards that which fills it; or as it were, a continual sucking in of present existence, or continuation of actual being, from somewhat preexistent. I think there is a liberal error in this, and instead of life sensitive, as I take it, there should be life vegetative. Now this doctrine of yours is wondrous strange. There is a motion & progress in life vegetative by way of augmentation, but not by way of generation.