A14095:29
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
CHAP. I.
YOUR first Argument is not like to strike your enemy with any great fear or despair. Arguments weak or weakly prosecuted, weakeneth the cause maintained, ⟨p. 13⟩strengtheneth the cause oppugned. And first it is not handsomely carried, thus If every particular generation hath causes, then all generations have some cause; implying that every generation hath many causes; all have but one. But carry it how you will, it is not capable of any sound inference. It is true, Every generation hath his cause: therefore all generations have causes; But what causes? only the same causes, which every one hath a part, aggregated together. For as you make an aggregation of particular generations; so the cause of this aggregation, inferred, can be but an aggregation of the particular causes of particular generations. So that nothing at all is concluded here hence distinct from the premises, much less the being of the Godhead hereby evidenced. Then your second inference is as wild, when you add, Otherwise all should not be of one kind or nature. For there is no congruity in affirming the whole by aggregation, to be of the same kind or nature with every particular. For every particular is unum per se consistinge ex actu & potentia; But the whole by aggregation is unum per accidens, consisting of many particulars (each whereof is unum per se) heaped together, not by any natural union united into one. As we do not say the bushel of corn is of the same kind with every particular grain, as also it cannot be said to be of a diverse kind in any congruity, although there were diverse kinds of grains therein; But rather an heap of grains, whether of the same kind, or of diverse kinds. Again you propose your argument, not only of the generation of Man, who is of one kind, but of all generable bodies, who are well known to be of diverse kinds, & therefore why should you account it any absurdity, for all these to be not of one kind or nature? Furthermore, when you make show of such an Inference as this, All must have some cause, otherwise they be not of one kind or nature, you do hereby imply, that All, that have some cause, are in a fair way to be of the same kind or nature, which upon consideration you will find to be utterly untrue. For all creatures have some cause, yet are they not any thing the more of one kind or nature;