A14095:290
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And to my understanding his meaning is no other, then that the essence of things generable is as it were esse fluens, like as we say, linea est fluxus puncti in longitudinem. And thereupon his first sentence is this, that take away erit from things generable, and forthwith they cease to be: And to things that are not such, if you add erit to them, it shall befall them a sede ipfive esse labe, to slide from the seat of being; All which are but odd strains of expressions of that which to know is worth just nothing, if at all there be any sound truth in their subtleties: But hence he concludes indeed that the being of a thing generable is not natural unto it; and therefore (you will say) he must have it from something, and what can that be, but from the fountain of life; as it is well known Plato first, and accordingly Platonics maintained, that the world was made by God.
And to my understanding his meaning is no other, then that the essence of things generable is as it were esse fluens, like as we say, linea est fluxus puncti in longitudinem. And therupon his first sentence is this, that take away erit from things generable, and forthwith they cease to be: And to things that are not such, if you add erit to them, it shall befall them a sede ipfiue esse labe, to slide from the seate of being; All which are but odd streynes of expressions of that which to know is worth just nothing, if at all there be any sound truth in theyr subtleties: But hence he concludes indeed that the being of a thing generable is not naturall unto it; and therefore (you will say) he must have it from something, and what can that be, but from the founteyne of life; as it is well knowne Plato first, and accordingly Platonickes maynteyned, that the world was made by God.
To this I answer, that albeit they attributed the making of the world to God not out of nothing, but out of matter actually preexistent; yet here Plotinus discourseth, not of the creation whereby the world was made, but of generation, whereby the parts of it were continually maintained; Neither doth he discourse of the efficiency of the being of things generable, but only of the formality thereof: But if over and above a question were moved as touching the efficiency of being, who can doubt but his answer would be either ascribing this to the individual generating, and virtus seminalis as his instrument, working to the extracting of forms ex potentia materiae; or otherwise to the Dator formarum; in neither of which should he as an heathen man ascend unto the inexhaustible fountain of life, whither you would draw him, to make the magnifying of his excellent observations the more specious: But what should Christians expect from the Scholar of Ammonius and Mr. of Dorphity? Now, whereas he confines this to things generable, do you magnify that also! What think you of Auguls? Is not their being also a continual draught or receipt of being from the inexhaustible fountain of life, as well as the being of things generable?