Jackson himself received from the former of ubiquity. For what Christian can satisfy himself in wondering, how erit illa die, (which is the usual expression of Gods decree, in the Prophets phrase) can be interpreted by erit aut non erit? how all the promises, which declare Gods decree of dispensing his grace, upon all nations, by the ministry of men, as ra ne ⟨image 3⟩or dew upon herbs, should be so glossed; it shall either rain, or not rain? or how all the decreed promises concerning the prevailing course of the Sun of righteousness in & by his, & his servants activity, should be flouted with this disjunction: it shall shine, or not shine? It would bring some fruit of admiration, if any Prince or Law maker, should make no other decree, about such things as concern their, and their subjects good, but merely disjunctive, either men shall do so, or not so; either they shall do good, or suffer evil: For though men have not power of determining absolutely future actions, yet they come nearer to that, then the indifferency of an even-weighing disjunction doth import. They put so much weight as the efficacy of their will can bear, to that scale wherein they place, this shall be. But Plato and Plotinus conceived (or rather in some of their discourses expressed) no more then this: All Christians therefore are by D. Jackson called back again to this, as if by the Prophets and Apostles they had been carried too far; It can not indeed be denied, but the Platonists did commonly so decipher their humane ideas of divine decreeing as D. Jackson doth. For Alcinons de doctrina Platonis, cap. 12. hath the same relation in plain terms, which D. Jackson hath turned into his strong lines of Oxford: Sic fatum (ex sententia Platonis) pronunciat: quaecunque anima talem vitam elegerit, & hujusmodi quaedam commiserit, consequenter talia patietur. Libera ergo est anima, & in ejus arbitrio, vel agere, vel non agere ponitur; quod autem sequitur actionem, ab ipso fato perfinitur. Veluti ex eo quod Paris Helenam rapiet, quod quidem in ejus erat arbitrio, sequetur ut Graeci de ⟨image 4⟩Helena decertent. Indeterminatum atque indifferens natura sua, libertate nostra, in utram placuerit, stater lancem quodam modo declinante, mox aut verum aut falsum, ex possibili sit. But if D.
Iackson himself receyved from the former of ubiquity. For what Christian can satisfie himself in wondering, how erit illa die, (which is the usuall expression of Gods decree, in the Prophets phrase) can be interpreted by erit aut non erit? how all the promises, which declare Gods decree of dispensing his grace, upon all nations, by the ministery of men, as ra ne ⟨image 3⟩or dew upon hearbs, should be so glossed; it shall eyther raine, or not raine? or how all the decreed promises concerning the prevayling course of the Sunne of righteousnes in & by his, & his servāts activitie, should be flouted with this disjunction: it shall shine, or not shine? It would bring some fruit of admiration, if any Prince or Law maker, should make no other decree, about such things as concerne their, and their subjects good, but meerly disjunctive, eyther men shall doe so, or not so; eyther they shall doe good, or suffer evill: For though men have not power of determining absolutely future actions, yet they come neerer to that, then the indifferencie of an even-weighing disjunction doth import. They putte so much weight as the efficacie of their will can bear, to that scale wherin they place, this shall be. But Plato and Plotinus conceyved (or rather in some of their discourses expressed) no more then this: All Christians therfore are by D. Iackson called back agayne to this, as if by the Prophets and Apostles they had been caried too farre; It can not indeed be denied, but the Platonists did commonly so decipher their humane ideas of divine decreeing as D. Iackson doth. For Alcinons de doctrina Platonis, cap. 12. hath the same relation in plaine termes, which D. Iackson hath turned into his strong lines of Oxford: Sic fatum (ex sententia Platonis) pronunciat: quaecunque anima talem vitam elegerit, & hujusmodi quaedam commiserit, consequenter talia patietur. Libera ergo est anima, & in ejus arbitrio, vel agere, vel non agere ponitur; quod autem sequitur actionem, ab ipso fato perfinitur. Veluti ex eo quod Paris Helenam rapiet, quod quidem in ejus erat arbitrio, sequetur ut Graeci de ⟨image 4⟩Helena decertent. Indeterminatum atque indifferens natura sua, libertate nostra, in utram placuerit, statere lancem quodam modo declināte, mox aut verum aut falsum, ex possibili sit. But if D.