A14095:35
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
where hence he concludeth that we must at length ascend to one who moveth, and is not moved, & that is the first mover, which (saith he) all understand to be God. The second is drawn from consideration of the nature of the cause efficient. For (saith he) we find even in insensible things an order of efficient causes, one subordinate to another, wherein he supposeth there cannot be an infinito progress; & secondly, that nothing can be the efficient cause of itself. Hence it followeth (saith he) we must ascend & rest in one supreme efficient, which acknowledgeth no efficient of it, and that all understand to be God. The third way is that, which hath been already prosecuted, from the consideration & comparison of things possible, with things necessary. The fourth is from the degrees that we find in things, as some things are more or less true, more or less good, more or less noble; whence he concludes, that something must be acknowledged to be most true, most good, most noble, & that to be the cause of truth, goodness, & perfection in all others, as fire is the cause of all heat. And that which is the cause of all others, we acknowledge to be God. The first and last is drawn from the government of the World, & the consideration of the order of things amongst themselves; whence he concludeth, there is some thing that ordereth them, and that must be God.
wher hence he concludethe that we must at lengthe ascend to one who moovethe, and is not mooved, & that is the first moover, which (saythe he) all understand to be God. The second is drawne from consideration of the nature of the cause efficient. For (saythe he) we finde even in insensible thinges an order of efficient causes, one subordinate to another, wherin he supposethe there cannot be an infinito progresse; & secondly, that nothing can be the efficient cause of itselfe. Hence it followeth (saythe he) we must ascend & rest in one supreame efficient, which acknowledgethe no efficient of it, and that all understand to be God. The third way is that, which hathe bene allready prosecuted, from the consideration & comparison of thinges possible, with thinges necessary. The fourthe is from the degrees that we finde in thinges, as some thinges are more or lesse true, more or lesse good, more or lesse noble; whence he concludes, that somethinge must be acknowledged to be most true, most good, most noble, & that to be the cause of truthe, goodnes, & perfection in all others, as fire is the cause of all heate. And that which is the cause of all others, we acknowledge to be God. The first and lastis drawne from the governement of the World, & the consideration of the order of thinges amongst themselves; whence he concludethe, there is some thinge that orderethe them, and that must be God.