A14095:359
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
We all grant, nothing in God is past, of that which belongs to God by denomination from within, nothing is to come. Only things without God are such as they may be both past, present, and to come, successively. I do not mislike that saying of Plotius, to wit that when we say God is always, we breed in our minds a wandering imagination of plurality or divisibility of duration. But yet so long as we understand Gods duration though indivisible yet equivalent to divisible succession in things without, there is no error, in which respect we may justly say with scripture God was, and is, and is to come, in as much as he was coexistent with things past, when they were existent, is coexistent to things present shall be coexistent to things to come.
We all grant, nothing in God is past, of that which belongs to God by denomination from within, nothing is to come. Only things without God are such as they may be both past, present, and to come, successively. I doe not mislike that sayinge of Plotius, to witt that when we say God is allwayes, we breede in our mindes a wandring imagination of pluralitie or divisibility of duration. But yet so long as we understand Gods duration though indivisible yet equivalent to divisible succession in things without, there is no errour, in which respect we may justly say with scripture God was, and is, and is to come, in as much as he was coexistent with things past, when they were existent, is coexistent to things present shall be coexistent to thinges to come.
And not to say, as you would have us, that God is now coexistent to things past, and to things to come as well as to things present. There is nothing hitherto alleged out of Boethius or Plotin, that can justify this; no more then in the definition of eternity made by Aquinas; yet Aquinas had a ⟨p. 177⟩conceit of the existence of all things both past and to come in Gods eternity, not only as they are known: For that is to exist rather in Gods knowledge then in his eternity, and that is esse secundum quid, and in esse cognito only, it is not to exist simplicitur, absolutely. I do not dislike your notification of eternity, to be that which always is and cannot cease to be, save that I find no virtue in the word to be extended to this latter clause; although I conceive, that whatsoever always is the same, doth necessarily imply such a nature, as cannot cease to be.