A14095:360
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And not to say, as you would have us, that God is now coexistent to things past, and to things to come as well as to things present. There is nothing hitherto alleged out of Boethius or Plotin, that can justify this; no more then in the definition of eternity made by Aquinas; yet Aquinas had a ⟨p. 177⟩conceit of the existence of all things both past and to come in Gods eternity, not only as they are known: For that is to exist rather in Gods knowledge then in his eternity, and that is esse secundum quid, and in esse cognito only, it is not to exist simplicitur, absolutely. I do not dislike your notification of eternity, to be that which always is and cannot cease to be, save that I find no virtue in the word to be extended to this latter clause; although I conceive, that whatsoever always is the same, doth necessarily imply such a nature, as cannot cease to be.
And not to say, as you would have us, that God is now coexistent to things past, and to things to come as well as to things present. There is nothing hitherto alleaged out of Boetius or Plotin, that can justifie this; no more then in the definition of eternitie made by Aquinas; yet Aquinas had a ⟨p. 177⟩conceyte of the existence of all thinges both past and to come in Gods eternitie, not only as they are knowne: For that is to exist rather in Gods knowledge then in his eternitie, and that is esse secundum quid, and in esse cognito only, it is not to exist simplicitur, absolutely. I doe not dislike your notification of eternitie, to be that which allwayes is and cannot cease to be, save that I finde no vertue in the word to be extended to this latter clause; allthoughe I conceave, that whatsoever allwayes is the same, dothe necessarily imply such a nature, as cannot cease to be.
And therefore the Apostle takes eternal power and Godhead to be terms equivalent. You say that in true Philosophical contemplation it is not one thing truly to be & always to be. There is a typographical error in this, if I be not deceived; and the sentence should run thus, It is but one thing truly to be and always to be. This I take to be your meaning, but I acknowledge no truth in it. For if this were true, then all creatures should have no true being; for certainly they are not always.