A14095:52
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And Hurtado de Mendosa, a Spanish Jesuit, and a late 1Writer, is most eager in the maintenance of this. So far of are your propositions from carrying evidence in their for heads. Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent. For you suppose, that whatsoever hath cause of being hath also a beginning, of being, and that in time. But this is notably untrue unto us Christians. For the Son and Second person in the Trinity hath a cause of his being, to wit the Father. Likewise the H. Ghost, hath not only a cause, ⟨p. 28⟩but causes of his being, to wit both the Father and the Son, for he proceedeth from them both; yet hath he not such beginning of being as you speak of. For both he and the Son are everlasting like unto the Father. Your second reason is worst of all, as when you say: For omnis causa est principium, & omne causatum est principiatum. For in the meaning of this proposition causa and principium, are taken for voces synonymae, words of the same signification; not signifying two things, the one whereof is consequent unto the other. And what sober Scholar would affirme, that omnis causa est principium, as principium signifieth the beginning of being, whereas indeed it is the cause of beginning of being to its effect, rather then formally to be styled the beginning of being it self. That which followeth of the limits of things, more easily or more hardly discerned, according as the cause is found to be preexistent in time or no, is an assertion as wild, as the similitude whereby you illustrate it; and all nothing to the purpose, to prove, that whatsoever hath cause of being, hath also limits of being, though still you proceed ambiguously without distinction, either of being, or of the limits thereof.
And Hurtado de Mendosa, a Spanishe Iesuite, and a late 1Writer, is most eager in the mayntenance of this. So farre of are your propositions from caryinge evidence in their for heads. Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent. For you suppose, that whatsoever hath cause of beinge hath allso a beginninge, of beinge, and that in time. But this is notably untrue unto us Christians. For the Sonne and Second person in the Trinitie hathe a cause of his beinge, to witt the Father. Likewise the H. Ghost, hathe not only a cause, ⟨p. 28⟩