A14095:678
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
At first I thought the same difference had been intended though variously expressed, that the Reader might satisfy himself with which expression he pleased; little thinking that your self who take upon you herein to instruct others, were to seek, whether wisdom differed from knowledge, in the object known, or in the manner of knowing things; yet upon second thoughts this seems to be your meaning. But suppose the truth of both concerning wisdom, namely that it knows things of worth and useful, and that it knows them in a perfect manner; yet I pray consider, what a mad thing is it to say, that herein it differs from knowledge. Doth the knowledge of things useful differ from knowledge? well you may say it differs from the knowledge of things less useful, or not useful at all, but surely it differs not from knowledge. So likewise the perfect manner of knowing things, may be said to differ from an imperfect manner of knowing them, but surely it differs not from the knowing of them. For we do not use to say that the species is contradistinct from the genus, but rather one species from another. I profess I am touched with no small regret to consider how much time I am like to wast in correcting such anomalies, if your book should be too frequent in them.
At first I thought the same difference had bene intended though variously expressed, that the Reader might satisfie himselfe with which expression he pleased; litle thinkeinge that your selfe who take upon you herein to instructe others, were to seeke, whether wisedome differed from knowledge, in the object knowne, or in the manner of knowinge thinges; yet upon seconde thoughts this seemes to be your meaninge. But suppose the truth of both concerning wisedome, namely that it knowes thinges of woorth and usefull, and that it knowes them in a perfecte manner; yet I pray consider, what a mad thing is it to say, that herein it differs from knowledg. Doth the knowledge of thinges usefull differ from knowledge? well you may say it differs from the knowledge of thinges lesse usefull, or not usefull at all, but surely it differs not from knowledge. So likewise the perfecte manner of knowinge thinges, may be sayd to differ from an imperfecte manner of knowinge them, but surely it differs not from the knowinge of them. For we doe not use to say that the species is contradistinct from the genus, but rather one species from another. I professe I am touched with no small regret to consider how much time I am like to wast in correctinge such anomalies, if your booke should be too frequent in them.