A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…

Yet I fear not any of these colours, but am persuaded that each is impossible, and that the impossibility of each may be demonstrated, and the reasons to the contrary evidently refuted. But you hitherto have rather begged what you undertook to prove, then proved it. Yet you proceed, saying things caused are always limited. But you should have proved, that things of limited essence are always caused, and have a beginning of their duration. So that this your proposition is nothing to the purpose, were it true. But neither is this proposition always true, as hath been showed in the example of the persons in the Trinity. And yet on this ⟨p. 40⟩point, which is neither universally true, nor at all to any purpose, you insist liberally in your following discourse.

Yet I feare not any of these colours, but am persuaded that each is impossible, and that the impossibilitie of eache may be demonstrated, and the reasons to the contrary evidently refuted. But you hitherto have rather begged what you undertooke to proove, then prooved it. Yet you proceede, sayinge thinges caused are allwayes limited. But you shoulde have prooved, that thinges of limited essence are allwayes caused, and have a beginninge of their duration. So that this your proposition is nothing to the purpose, were it true. But neyther is this proposition allwayes true, as hathe bene shewed in the example of the persons in the Trinitie. And yet on this ⟨p. 40⟩point, which is neyther universally true, nor at all to any purpose, you insist liberally in your followinge discourse.

You should prove, that whatsoever hath limits of extension, the same also hath beginning of duration: which yet I deny not to be a truth, and demonstrable, but of the demonstration hereof, your discourse hath failed hitherunto. When you argue thus, It is as possible to put a new fashion upon nothing; as for any thing that is, to take limits, or set form of being from nothing. You corrupt the opinion of your opposites and not refute it. For they that maintain the World had no beginning, do also maintain, that it took no beginning of the limits thereof: And as they do not say, the World took his beginning from nothing; so neither do they say, that the World took the beginning of his limits, or took his limits or form from nothing. Now you, by this form of your dispute, do instruct Atheists how to discourse against the creation of the World, thus; If God made the World out of nothing, then he put a new fashion upon nothing: But it is impossible that any new fashion should be put upon nothing; therefore it is impossible that God should make the World out of nothing. Now in this Syllogism the minor is most true. For not any thing can consist of nothing as the matter and of a fashion, as the form thereof. But the consequence of the major, is most untrue. For when we say that God made the World out of nothing, our meaning is not that nothing was the matter whereof the World was made, but only that it was the terminus a quo, not materia ex qua. As much as to say God made the World, whereas nothing went before, neither had God any matter whereon to work when he made the World. And Philosophers affirming that the World had no beginning, do therewithal deny that the World took either being or limits from any thing. You turn their negative into an affirmative, so to corrupt their opinion, in stead of confuting it. They thought, it needed not any thing to give it being or bounds of being, least they should be driven to affirm that something could be made out of nothing: whereas they had rather maintain; that the world