A14095:720
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Lastly this proposition which you crave to be admitted is like a Trojan horse, it will do you more harm then good, as ere we part from this section shall be made manifest. Yet what need you desire more, your conclusion is granted you, namely that of necessity there must be contingency, supposing Gods decree. For Gods decrees are only of doing, or suffering some things, as it is free for God whether he will do them, or suffer them, yea or no. And therefore though God had not at all decreed contingency, yet decreeing any thing, of necessity there must be contingency, though he had decreed nothing else, but such things as we count most necessary, in the course of nature. But we grant also that God did decree contingency, and decrees necessity in respect of second causes; as for example God did decree to make fire of such a nature as to heat or burn necessarily, the Sun of such a ⟨p. 271⟩nature as to enlighten the air necessarily, heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards, and all this necessarily. Necessarily I say in respect of second causes, though this necessity was mere contingency, in respect of the will of God. For he could have chosen whether there should have been any fire, or world at all, yea and can hinder the fire from burning if it please him, as he did hinder it from taking hold of the three noble children in the furnace of Babylon. And as God hath decreed many things to come to pass necessarily, so hath he decreed many things to come to pass contingently, as in course of nature many things there are that come to pass contingently by the will of God, and especially the actions of men and Angels.
Lastly this proposition which you crave to be admitted is like a Troian horse, it will doe you more harme then good, as ere we part from this section shall be made manifest. Yet what neede you desire more, your conclusion is granted you, namely that of necessity there must be contingency, supposing Gods decree. For Gods decrees are onely of doing, or suffering some thinges, as it is free for God whether he will doe them, or suffer them, yea or no. And therefore though God had not at all decreed contingency, yet decreing any thinge, of necessity there must be contingency, though he had decreed nothing else, but such thinges as we count most necessary, in the course of nature. But we graunt also that God did decree contingency, and decrees necessity in respect of second causes; as for example God did decree to make fire of such a nature as to heate or burne necessarily, the Sunne of such a