A14095:722
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Nothing (we say) comes to pass, but what God hath decreed shall come to pass. Again nothing comes to pass after any manner whatsoever, but that God hath decreed, it to come to pass after that manner; whether it come to pass necessarily, God hath decreed it shall come to pass necessarily; or whether contingently, God hath decreed it shall come to pass contingently. In a word that which you deliver falteringly we say plainly Nothing comes to pass otherwise, then God hath decreed it shall come to pass. So then I say we grant your conclusion. But how doth it appear that this conclusion of yours contradicteth our former conclusion which was this, therefore Every thing comes to pass of necessity. You will say, if every thing comes to pass of necessity, then nothing ⟨p. 272⟩comes to pass contingently. I confess this consequence is plausible, but to whom? to none but ignorants. Of which number you are not. For your very conclusion it self in the very outward face of it utterly contradicteth this consequence. For is not your conclusion this, therefore of necessity there must be contingency, which manifestly justifieth that necessity and contingency may stand together, and are nothing opposite. And how, I pray, is this necessity, but in respect of the decree of God? And did our conclusion proceed in any other sense? Your self have acknowledge that it doth not, though therein somewhat faltering also, as it is your usual course, in taking notice of any truth that makes against your tenets. For are not these your words in interpreting our conclusion, All things are necessary in respect of Gods decree? Only you add at least in this respect as if you would fain draw it to another meaning. Now our meaning is plain. All things come not to pass necessarily, nor all things contingently, but some things come to pass necessarily as works of nature, some things contingently as the actions of men. But by your own received Maxim Nothing can come to pass otherwise then God hath decreed they shall come to pass, therefore God hath decreed that some things shall come to pass necessarily, some things contingently.
Nothing (we say) comes to passe, but what God hath decreed shall come to passe. Againe nothing comes to passe after any manner whatsoever, but that God hath decreed, it to come to passe after that manner; whether it come to passe necessarily, God hath decreed it shall come to passe necessarily; or whether contingently, God hath decreed it shall come to passe contingently. In a word that which you deliver faultringly we say plainly Nothing comes to passe otherwise, then God hath decreed it shall come to passe. So then I say we graunt your conclusion. But how doth it appeare that this conclusion of yours contradicteth our former conclusion which was this, therefore Every thinge comes to passe of necessity. You will say, if every thinge comes to passe of necessity, then nothinge