A14095:723
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But by your own received principle, whatsoever God hath decreed to come to pass, that must of necessity come to pass, therefore of necessity it must come to pass that some things shall come to pass necessarily, some things contingently. Now give me leave to represent your own ill carriage, to your own eyes. The Major proposition in our syllogism, and the Major proposition in your syllogism are all one as your self acknowledge in these words, Let the Major proposition stand as it did before. Now if they be all one why do you not propose them after one manner? do you practise to gull your Reader presuming this leggier du main of yours shall not be discovered?
But by your owne receaved principle, whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe, that must of necessity come to passe, therefore of necessity it must come to passe that some thinges shall come to passe necessarily, some thinges contingently. Now give me leave to represent your owne ill carriage, to your owne eyes. The Maior proposition in our syllogisme, and the Maior proposition in your syllogisme are all one as your selfe acknowledge in these wordes, Let the Maior proposition stand as it did before. Now if they be all one why doe you not propose them after one manner? doe you practise to gull your Reader presuming this legier du maine of yours shall not be discovered?
The Major proposition in both is all one I confess as touching each part, both the middle term, and the greater extreme. But when the greater extreme comes to be repeated ⟨p. 273⟩in the conclusion, it is repeated in a far different manner in our conclusion then in yours. For in the Major proposition of each syllogism it runs thus, must of necessity come to pass, but in our conclusion it is corrupted thus, must come to pass necessarily. But in your conclusion it is mended thus, of necessity there must be contingency; which is as much as to say, of necessity it must come to pass. I say in ours it is corrupted; for whereas in these words must of necessity come to pass, the word necessity is indifferently to be referred to that which goes before, or that which comes after; and indeed ought to be referred to that which goes before; in the conclusion it is put in the last place, so that it cannot be referred but to the words come to pass. And it is mended in yours, for in the conclusion it is put in the first place of the greater extreme, and so takes away all danger of referring it to the last words, come to pass. As for example, had our conclusion been shaped like yours as touching the majus extremum which is the same in both, the harshness of it had been qualified, thus, ergo all things of necessity must come to pass, which hath a fair, and facile construction thus; though some things come to pass necessarily, and some things contingently, yet all things as being decreed by God, must of necessity come to pass, both those things that come to pass necessarily, and those things that come to pass contingently. In like sort had your conclusion been shaped by you as ours is, as touching the greater extreme, as indeed it ought, the greater extreme being all one in both, then your conclusion would have seemed as harsh as ours thus, ergo Contingency must come to pass of necessity or thus some effects shall be contingent of necessity, for so runs the Minor, God hath decreed contingency, or that some effects shall be contingent as well as some are necessary. And as for the consequences which hence you make they are nothing contradictory to those extracts you made from our conclusion.