A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…

The Major proposition in both is all one I confess as touching each part, both the middle term, and the greater extreme. But when the greater extreme comes to be repeated ⟨p. 273⟩in the conclusion, it is repeated in a far different manner in our conclusion then in yours. For in the Major proposition of each syllogism it runs thus, must of necessity come to pass, but in our conclusion it is corrupted thus, must come to pass necessarily. But in your conclusion it is mended thus, of necessity there must be contingency; which is as much as to say, of necessity it must come to pass. I say in ours it is corrupted; for whereas in these words must of necessity come to pass, the word necessity is indifferently to be referred to that which goes before, or that which comes after; and indeed ought to be referred to that which goes before; in the conclusion it is put in the last place, so that it cannot be referred but to the words come to pass. And it is mended in yours, for in the conclusion it is put in the first place of the greater extreme, and so takes away all danger of referring it to the last words, come to pass. As for example, had our conclusion been shaped like yours as touching the majus extremum which is the same in both, the harshness of it had been qualified, thus, ergo all things of necessity must come to pass, which hath a fair, and facile construction thus; though some things come to pass necessarily, and some things contingently, yet all things as being decreed by God, must of necessity come to pass, both those things that come to pass necessarily, and those things that come to pass contingently. In like sort had your conclusion been shaped by you as ours is, as touching the greater extreme, as indeed it ought, the greater extreme being all one in both, then your conclusion would have seemed as harsh as ours thus, ergo Contingency must come to pass of necessity or thus some effects shall be contingent of necessity, for so runs the Minor, God hath decreed contingency, or that some effects shall be contingent as well as some are necessary. And as for the consequences which hence you make they are nothing contradictory to those extracts you made from our conclusion.

The Maior proposition in both is all one I confesse as touching each part, both the midle tearme, and the greater extreame. But when the greater extreame comes to be repeated ⟨p. 273⟩in the conclusion, it is repeated in a farre different manner in our conclusion then in yours. For in the Maior proposition of each syllogisme it runnes thus, must of necessity come to passe, but in our conclusion it is corrupted thus, must come to passe necessarily. But in your conclusion it is mended thus, of necessitie there must bee contingency; which is as much as to say, of necessitie it must come to passe. I say in ours it is corrupted; for whereas in these words must of necessitie come to passe, the word necessity is indifferently to be referred to that which goes before, or that which comes after; and indeed ought to be referred to that which goes before; in the conclusion it is put in the last place, so that it cannot bee referred but to the words come to passe. And it is mended in yours, for in the conclusion it is put in the first place of the greater extreame, and so takes away all danger of referring it to the last words, come to passe. As for example, had our conclusion beene shaped like yours as touching the majus extremum which is the same in both, the harshnes of it had beene qualified, thus, ergo all things of necessity must come to passe, which hath a faire, and facile construction thus; though some things come to passe necessarily, and some things contingently, yet all things as being decreed by God, must of necessity come to passe, both those things that come to passe necessarily, and those things that come to passe contingently. In like sort had your conclusion beene shaped by you as ours is, as touching the greater extreame, as indeed it ought, the greater extreame being all one in both, then your conclusion would have seemed as harsh as ours thus, ergo Contingency must come to passe of necessity or thus some effects shall bee contingent of necessitie, for so runnes the Minor, God hath decreed contingency, or that some effects shall be contingent as well as some are necessary. And as for the consequences which hence you make they are nothinge contradictory to those extracts you made from our conclusion.