A14095:725
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
For all those impossibilities deduced from our conclusion, were onely secundum quid and upon supposition of Gods decree, which kind of impossibility is always joined with a simple and absolute possibility to the contrary, ⟨p. 274⟩secluding Gods decree. For even those things which God decreeth to come to pass contingently as the actions of men, must necessarily by the virtue of Gods decree come to pass, in such a manner as joined with a possibility of not coming to pass, otherwise it were impossible they should come to pass contingently. About which truth, namely that God decreeth some things to come to pass contingently, why do you falter in this foul manner? If you like it not, why do you not in plain terms contest against it, if you do approve of it, why do you not plainly profess it, but carry your self in the clouds of generality and ambiguity? As first, when you say, God hath decreed contingency, here a man might be apt to conceive, that you do believe that God hath decreed that some things shall come to pass contingently. Especially if he understand that God decreeth not only necessity, but also that some things shall necessarily come to pass, which may seem to urge you in like sort to maintain that God decreeth contingency, so he should also decree that some things shall come to pass contingently.
For all those impossibilities deduced from our conclusion, were onely secundum quid and upon supposition of Gods decree, which kind of impossibilitie is alwaies joyned with a simple and absolute possibilitie to the contrary, ⟨p. 274⟩secluding Gods decree. For even those things which God decreeth to come to passe contingently as the actions of men, must necessarily by the vertue of Gods decree come to passe, in such a manner as joyned with a possibilitie of not comming to passe, otherwise it were impossible they should come to passe contingently. About which truth, namely that God decreeth some things to come to passe contingently, why doe you faulter in this fowle manner? If you like it not, why doe you not in plaine termes contest against it, if you doe approve of it, why doe you not plainly professe it, but carry your selfe in the clouds of generalitie and ambiguity? As first, when you say, God hath decreed contingency, here a man might bee apt to conceave, that you doe beleeve that God hath decreed that some things shall come to passe contingently. Especially if he understand that God decreeth not only necessity, but allso that some thinges shall necessarily come to passe, which may seeme to urge you in like sort to mainteyne that God decreeth contingency, so he should also decree that some things shall come to passe contingently.