A14095:728
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
do withal maintain that God determines the will of man and Angels to work contingently and freely in all their actions, and consequently neither doth he decree any other wise to determine them, which doctrine maintains that Gods will and decree doth lay upon all reasonable creatures a contingent manner of operation rather then any necessity. Yet upon supposition of Gods decree, they maintain that of necessity such things as God hath decreed shall come to pass, and that after that manner as God hath decreed it to come to pass, that is, either necessarily as all the operations of natural agents, or contingently and freely, as all the actions of reasonable creatures. But this opinion you dislike, and upon what reason? Undoubtedly it seems they had need be weighty ones, considering that this question hath been abundantly canvassed, by the most learned and subtlest among School-divines. And indeed it is one of the first points whereabout I have been acquainted with School divinity: Scotus proposeth this question, to wit; Now God doth foreknow future contingents; for thus they in their wisdom thought fit to propose it, to wit, of future contingents in special not as you do, of future things in general. And he proposeth two opinions hereabouts which he impugneth. The first, is the opinion of Bonaventura, who maintained that God did foreknow future contingents, by the Ideas of them in the mind of God. The second is the opinion of Aquinas, who made the ground of Gods foreknowing of future contingents, to be Their real existence in eternity. Both these Scotus impugneth with such excellent arguments to my judgement at that time, and withal so clear, that as I remember this brought me first in love with School divinity. The third opinion is his own, which there he maintaineth, & that is this, which you invade, ⟨p. 277⟩namely, That God knows all future contingents by knowing his own will and purpose to produce them. And as touching your objection that God foreknows the sins of men as well as their good actions, which yet undoubtedly he did not decree to produce, his answer is, that this also is foreknown by God in as much as he knows the determination of his will to produce every sinful act as touching the substance of it, and to permit the obliquity of it.
doe withall maintayne that God determines the will of man and Angells to worke contingently and freely in all their actions, and consequently neither doth hee decree any other wise to determine them, which doctrine maintaynes that Gods will and decree doth lay upon all reasonable creatures a contingent manner of operation rather then any necessity. Yet upon supposition of Gods decree, they maintayne that of necessitie such thinges as God hath decreed shall come to passe, and that after that manner as God hath decreed it to come to passe, that is, either necessarily as all the operations of naturall agents, or contingently and freely, as all the actions of reasonable creatures. But this opinion you dislike, and upon what reason? Vndoubtedly it seemes they had need bee weighty ones, considering that this question hath beene abundantly canvassed, by the most learned and subtilest among Schoole-divines. And indeed it is one of the first points whereabout I have beene acquainted with Schoole divinity: Scotus proposeth this questiō, to witt; Now God doth foreknowe future contingents; for thus they in their wisedome thought fitt to propose it, to witt, of future contingents in speciall not as you doe, of future thinges in generall. And he proposeth two opinions hereabouts which he impugneth. The first, is the opinion of Bonaventura, who maintayned that God did foreknowe future contingents, by the Ideaes of them in the mind of God. The second is the opinion of Aquinas, who made the ground of Gods foreknowing of future contingents, to bee Their reall existence in eternitie. Both these Scotus impugneth with such excellent arguments to my judgement at that time, and withall so cleare, that as I remember this brought me first in love with Schoole divinity. The third opinion is his owne, which there he maintayneth, & that is this, which you invade,