A14095:747
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Again, considering that necessity and contingency are but modi rerum certain manners of bringing things to pass, & therefore cannot exist without the things themselves which are said to exist and to be brought to pass either necessarily or contingently. Therefore it cannot be said that God doth produce the necessity or contingency of this or that particular, unless he produceth the particular it self; neither can he be said to decree the contingency or necessity of this or that particular, except he decree the thing it self. So that for God to decree the necessity or contingency of this or that particular, is nothing else then to decree that this particular shall necessarily come to pass, or such a particular shall contingently come to pass.
Agayne, considering that necessitie and contingency are but modi rerum certaine manners of bringing things to passe, & therfore cannot exist without the things themselves wh•ch are sayd to exist and to be brought to passe either necessarily or contingently. Therefore it cannot be sayd that God doth produce the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular, unlesse he produceth the particular it selfe; neither can he be sayd to decree the contingency or necessity of this or that particular, except he decree the thing it selfe. So that for God to decree the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular, is nothing else then to decree that this particular shall necessarily come to passe, or such a particular shall contingently come to passe.
Neither is it reasonable to affirm, that God doth decree necessity or contingency in general, but not the necessity of this particular, or the contingency of this particular. For like as generals cannot exist but in particulars, so neither can generals be otherwise produced then by producing particulars. So it is impossible that God should decree the producing of generals otherwise then by producing of particulars. Now there is a contingency taken in another sense, which doth not accompany the existence of any thing but only the essence of it, and denominates it before it doth exist, as when we say rain to morrow is contingent, it is as much as to say it is possible to rain, it is possible not to rain. So touching the actions of men, of any action we may say it is contingent, for as much as it is in the power of man to do it or no. Now this kind of contingency is not always the object of Gods decree. For in this sense the continuation of the World is a contingent thing; for it may continue or no. So before the World was made, it was possible to be and not to be, and so the making of it contingent, but not by the decree of God. For nothing is such by the decree of God but it might be altered, for Gods decree is a free act. But it was impossible that the World should not be of a contingent nature, like as it is impossible that God should not have power to make the World, or not to make it according to his will. Nay the very works of men and Angels in this kind of contingency are not the object of Gods decree; for in as much as they are said to be possible to be or not to be, this is not from the decree of God but rather from the nature of God, as all necessary truths are derived therefrom.