A14095:748
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Neither is it reasonable to affirm, that God doth decree necessity or contingency in general, but not the necessity of this particular, or the contingency of this particular. For like as generals cannot exist but in particulars, so neither can generals be otherwise produced then by producing particulars. So it is impossible that God should decree the producing of generals otherwise then by producing of particulars. Now there is a contingency taken in another sense, which doth not accompany the existence of any thing but only the essence of it, and denominates it before it doth exist, as when we say rain to morrow is contingent, it is as much as to say it is possible to rain, it is possible not to rain. So touching the actions of men, of any action we may say it is contingent, for as much as it is in the power of man to do it or no. Now this kind of contingency is not always the object of Gods decree. For in this sense the continuation of the World is a contingent thing; for it may continue or no. So before the World was made, it was possible to be and not to be, and so the making of it contingent, but not by the decree of God. For nothing is such by the decree of God but it might be altered, for Gods decree is a free act. But it was impossible that the World should not be of a contingent nature, like as it is impossible that God should not have power to make the World, or not to make it according to his will. Nay the very works of men and Angels in this kind of contingency are not the object of Gods decree; for in as much as they are said to be possible to be or not to be, this is not from the decree of God but rather from the nature of God, as all necessary truths are derived therefrom.
Neyther is it reasonable to affirme, that God doth decree necessitie or contingency in generall, but not the necessitie of this particular, or the contingency of this particular. For like as generalls cannot exist but in particulars, so neither can generalls be otherwise produced then by producing particulars. So it is impossible that God should decree the producing of generalls otherwise then by producing of particulars. Now there is a contingency taken in another sense, which doth not accompany the existence of any thing but only the essence of it, and denominates it before it doth exist, as when we say raine to morrow is contingent, it is as much as to say it is possible to raine, it is possible not to raine. So touching the actions of men, of any action we may say it is contingent, for as much as it is in the power of man to doe it or no. Now this kind of contingency is not alwayes the object of Gods decree. For in this sense the continuation of the World is a contingent thing; for it may continue or no. So before the World was made, it was possible to be and not to be, and so the making of it contingent, but not by the decree of God. For nothing is such by the decree of God but it might be altered, for Gods decree is a free act. But it was impossible that the World should not be of a contingent nature, like as it is impossible that God should not have power to make the World, or not to make it according to his will. Nay the very workes of men and Angells in this kind of contingency are not the object of Gods decree; for in as much as they are sayd to be possible to be or not to be, this is not from the decree of God but rather from the nature of God, as all necessary truthes are derived therefrom.