A14095:749
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Neither is it in the power of God to make that the works of men and Angels should not be possible to be or not to be. But if the possibility were the object of Gods decree, it might be otherwise. For Gods decree passeth forely upon every thing where upon it passeth, so that if he decree them to be possible, he might have decreed them not to be possible. Yet you seem to speak of contingents in no other sense then this, as when you say, God hath decreed that some effects ⟨p. 291⟩shall be contingent, although I confess it is so obscurely delivered that a man can hardly discern your meaning. But for farther discourse hereof you put us over to the article of creation. So likewise for the contingency of humane actions as decreed by God; your confirmation thereof we must expect, when you come to treat of mans fall. This, thus by fetching compass expressed by you, I doubt will prove no more then this, that God decreed to make man a free agent; yet you deliver it as if the demonstration hereof did require, and promise some exquisite performance. And I am verily persuaded you have a reach at such a kind of freedom, as to make it good, will surpass the performance of any School divine that ever was, from the days of Anselmus to the days wherein we live.
Neither is it in the power of God to make that the works of men and Angells should not be possible to be or not to be. But if the possibilitie were the object of Gods decree, it might be otherwise. For Gods decree passeth forely upon every thing where upon it passeth, so that if he decree them to be possible, he might have decreed them not to be possible. Yet you seeme to speake of contingents in no other sense then this, as when you say, God hath decreed that some effects ⟨p. 291⟩shall be contingent, although I confesse it is so obscurely delivered that a man can hardly discerne your meaning. But for farther discourse hereof you put us over to the article of creation. So likewise for the contingency of humane actions as decreed by God; your confirmation thereof we must expect, when you come to treat of mans fall. This, thus by fetching compasse expressed by you, I doubt will prove no more then this, that God decreed to make man a free agent; yet you deliver it as if the demonstration hereof did require, and promise some exquisite perfourmance. And I am verily perswaded you have a reach at such a kind of freedome, as to make it good, will surpasse the perfourmance of any Schoole divine that ever was, from the dayes of Anselmus to the dayes wherein we live.