A14095:763
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Neither if you did maintain that God is the true and principal cause of every free action, would we object that then you make Gods will to depend on ours; for there is no colour for any such objection; there is colour for the contrary, as namely, if he be the principal cause, then his will doth not depend on mine, but rather mine on his: and consequently our liberty seems to be infringed by making God the principal ⟨p. 299⟩cause of all our actions. Yet you take no notice of this objection, (much less take pains to answer it) but go on desperately (in show and that against your own tenet) to maintain, that our will is necessarily subject unto his. But whether you mean in producing thoughts & actions, (which alone is to the purpose) or in some other sense and respect you betray not.
Neither if you did maintaine that God is the true and principall cause of every free action, would wee object that then you make Gods will to depend on ours; for there is no colour for any such objection; there is colour for the contrary, as namely, if he be the principall cause, then his will doth not depend on mine, but rather mine on his: and consequently our liberty seemes to be infringed by making God the principall ⟨p. 299⟩cause of all our actions. Yet you take no notice of this objection, (much lesse take paynes to answere it) but goe on desperately (in shewe and that against your owne tenet) to maintayne, that our will is necessarily subject unto his. But whether you meane in producing thoughts & actions, (which alone is to the purpose) or in some other sense and respect you betray not.
Yet by the way what mean you to say that our will is contingently free; seeing this is as much as to say, it is possible that the will of man should not be free. But you give a reason and it is worthy our consideration if perhaps thereby, we may perceive to what issue of tolerable sense your present discourse may be brought. And the reason is this: For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angel he hath everlastingly decreed a proportionate end: to every antecedent possible, a correspondent consequent, which needs no other cause or means to produce it but only the reducing of possibility (granted by his decree) into act. For what way soever (of many equally possible) mans will doth incline, Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evil that befalls him for it. I looked for an elucidation of a former assertion or two of yours, namely, that God is the true and principal cause of every action, and deed that hath passed from you this year, like as he had been the cause (as you say) of every thought and action that might have passed from you, if the frame of your thoughts and actions had been altered.