A14095:764
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Yet by the way what mean you to say that our will is contingently free; seeing this is as much as to say, it is possible that the will of man should not be free. But you give a reason and it is worthy our consideration if perhaps thereby, we may perceive to what issue of tolerable sense your present discourse may be brought. And the reason is this: For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angel he hath everlastingly decreed a proportionate end: to every antecedent possible, a correspondent consequent, which needs no other cause or means to produce it but only the reducing of possibility (granted by his decree) into act. For what way soever (of many equally possible) mans will doth incline, Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evil that befalls him for it. I looked for an elucidation of a former assertion or two of yours, namely, that God is the true and principal cause of every action, and deed that hath passed from you this year, like as he had been the cause (as you say) of every thought and action that might have passed from you, if the frame of your thoughts and actions had been altered.
Yet by the way what meane you to say that our will is contingently free; seeing this is as much as to say, it is possible that the will of man should not be free. But you give a reason and it is worthy our consideration if perhaps therby, we may perceyve to what issue of tolerable sense your present discourse may be brought. And the reason is this: For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angell he hath everlastingly decreed a proportionate end: to every antecedent possible, a correspondent consequent, which needes no other cause or meanes to produce it but only the reducing of possibility (granted by his decree) into act. For what way soever (of many equally possible) mans will doth encline, Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evill that befalls him for it. I looked for an elucidation of a former assertion or two of yours, namely, that God is the true and principall cause of every action, and deede that hath passed from you this yeere, like as he had beene the cause (as you say) of every thought and action that might have passed from you, if the frame of your thoughts and actions had beene altered.