A14095:773
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Yet let me have one bout with you more in the point of reprobation also. God foreseeing some evil in man (say you) doth purpose to condemn him: Now because like as no evil can exist without Gods permission; so God could not foresee evil but upon presupposall of his purpose to permit it, it followeth that the decree to permit sin, is before the decree of God to damn for sin, therefore permission of sin is in Gods intention before damnation, and consequently it must be after it, in execution, as much as to say; God doth first damn men for sin, and afterwards permit them to sin. Hereupon you will reflect upon us with an interrogatory saying; Will you maintain that God did first decree to damn men for sin, and secondly to permit them to sin? I answer; If I did maintain this, I should look to be confuted by reason, and not to be cried down without reason, or contrary to all reason. Nay I had rather maintain an harsh opinion according unto reason, then a plausible opinion in contradiction unto manifest reason.
Yet let me have one bout with you more in the point of reprobation also. God foreseeing some evill in man (say you) doth purpose to condemne him: Now because like as no evill can exist without Gods permission; so God could not fo•see evill but upon presupposall of his purpose to permit it, it followeth that the decree to permit sinne, is before the decree of God to damne for sinne, therefore permission of sinne is in Gods intention before damnation, and consequently it must be after it, in execution, as much as to say; God doth first damne men for sinne, and afterwards permit them to sinne. Hereupon you will refl•ct upon us with an interrogatorie saying; Will you maintayne that God did first decree to damne men for sinne, and secondly to permit them to sinne? I answere; If I did maintayne this, I should looke to be confuted by reason, and not to be cried downe without reason, or contrarie to all reason. Nay I had rather maintayne an harsh opinion according unto reason, then a plausible opinion in contradiction unto manifest reason.
Secondly, I answer by negation; For I do not maintain either of these to be subordinate unto other in Gods intention, but rather coordinate; because neither of these things decreed is the end of the other, but both jointly make up an integral means tending to the manifestation of Gods glory in the way of justice, according to that of Aquinas, who professeth