A14095:774
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Secondly, I answer by negation; For I do not maintain either of these to be subordinate unto other in Gods intention, but rather coordinate; because neither of these things decreed is the end of the other, but both jointly make up an integral means tending to the manifestation of Gods glory in the way of justice, according to that of Aquinas, who professeth ⟨p. 305⟩that reprobation includeth the will of God of permitting sin, and of inferring damnation for sin. Now let us proceed to that which follows. It is absurd to say we have a possibility to do what we do not; but rather you should say we have an ability to do what we do not. For possibility is of a passive signification, not active: And ability to obey God, I confess we had in Adam, and in Adam we have lost it. That which you call the absolute necessity of Gods decrees, is not in respect of Gods act in […]. For his decrees are most free, but in respect of the event ensuing upon supposition of Gods decree. So then things freely decreed upon this supposition must necessarily come to pass. Both that which should and that which doth befall us floweth alike (you say) from the absolute necessity of Gods decree. Now because your present discourse is not of Gods power, but of his wisdom that you might not seem beside the text, you tell us in the close, that herein is seen Gods incomprehensible wisdom, that nothing falls out without the circumference of it; whereas that all things fall out as God hath decreed, it is rather the fruit of his power then his wisdom. And if you refer it to Gods knowledge, yet it is no part of God, wisdom. For what wisdom is it to know what he hath decreed, or what he meaneth to bring to pass, whereas any man though simple may know what himself meaneth to do? But to know what is fit to be done for the setting forth of his own glory, and to direct all things most conveniently hereunto, herein consists the wisdom of God. You content not your self with ascribing, a Circumference unto Gods wisdom, within which all things fall out, but you call it actual, also as if there were two sorts of circumferences, the one potential, the other actual.
Secondly, I answere by negation; For I doe not mayntayne either of these to be subordinate unto other in Gods intention, but rather coordinate; because neither of these thinges decreed is the end of the other, but both joyntly make up an integrall meanes tending to the manifestation of Gods glorie in the way of justice, according to that of Aquinas, who professeth ⟨p. 305⟩