A14095:797
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
In the next place you tell us, That some push our proneness to this error forward, by another, not distinguishing between contingency and uncertainty; who argue thus, That which is in it self uncertain, cannot certainly be known. Every future contingent is in it self uncertain, Ergo it is not possible that a future contingent should certainly be known. Thus another Hare is started by the way, which hindereth the pursuing of our first game, where we might have experience of your performance in opposing the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents, laid in the determination of his will, whereof God cannot be ignorant. And first you address your self to the removing of this new rub, by a distinction of a two fold uncertainty, one formally relative, another only denominative or fundamental. And, as if these terms needed no explication, you proceed to a resolution thus; That which is relatively uncertain, cannot be certainly known, for so it should be certain to him, to whom it is uncertain: But a future contingent, as it is contingent, doth not necessarily or formally include this relative uncertainty, although it usually be in part the foundation or cofounder of it. By relative uncertainty you understand uncertainty in relation to knowledge, in which sense to be uncertain, is to be such as whereof there cannot be certain knowledge. In which sense if the proposition proceeded, it were very idle, and identical, as if it were expressed thus; That which cannot certainly be known, cannot certainly be known: And they undoubtedly are very prone to error, that suffer themselves to be pushed forwards thereinto by such arguments as these, and thus interpreted. But we were wont to distinguish of Certitudo scientiae, & certitudo rei scitae, or scibilis; and you intimate such a distinction. For the relative uncertainty you speak of is the uncertainty of the knowledge, and the fundamental uncertainty is the uncertainty of the thing it self, and indeed the foundation of the uncertainty of knowledge. Now the argument proceeds manifestly from the one to the other, and the Medius terminus man fests its own meaning to be of fundamental uncertainty, whence it doth infer uncertainty of knowledge, for it proceeds thus: That which is uncertain in it self cannot ⟨p. 319⟩be certainly known.
In the next place you tell us, That some push our pronenesse to this errour forward, by another, not distinguishing betweene contingency and uncertainty; who argue thus, That which is in it selfe uncertaine, cannot certainly be knowne. Every future contingent is in it selfe uncertaine, Ergo it is not possible that a future contingent should certainly be knowne. Thus another Hare is started by the way, which hindreth the pursuing of our first game, where we might have experience of your performance in opposing the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents, layd in the determination of his will, whereof God cannot be ignorant. And first you addresse your selfe to the removing of this new rub, by a distinction of a two fold uncertainty, one formally relative, another onely denominative or fundamentall. And, as if these termes needed no explication, you proceed to a resolution thus; That which is relatively uncertaine, cannot be certainly knowne, for so it should be certaine to him, to whom it is uncertaine: But a future contingent, as it is contingent, doth not necessarily or formally include this relative uncertainty, although it usually be in part the foundation or cofounder of it. By relatve uncertainty you understand uncertainty in relation to knowledge, in which sense to be uncertaine, is to be such as whereof there cannot be certaine knowledge. In which sense if the proposition proceeded, it were very idle, and indenticall, as if it were expressed thus; That which cennot certainly be known, cannot certainly be knowne: And they undoubtedly are very prone to errour, that suffer themselves to be pushed forwards thereinto by such arguments as these, and thus interpreted. But we were wont to distinguish of Certitudo scientiae, & certitudo rei scitae, or scibilis; and you intimate such a distinction. For the relative uncertainty you speake of is the uncertainty of the knowledge, and the fundamentall uncertainty is the uncertainty of the thing it selfe, and indeed the foundation of the uncertainty of knowledge. Now the argument proceeds manifestly from the one to the other, and the Medius terminus man fests its owne meaning to bee of fundamentall uncertainty, whence it doth infer uncertainty of knowledge, for it proceeds thus: That which is uncertaine in it selfe cannot