A14095:799
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
So then the syllogism corruptly interpreted by you, and the truth of it obscured by a preposterous distinction, take it in its proper vigour and force, is thus; That which in it self hath no foundation of certainty, cannot be certainly known. But every future contingent hath in it self no foundation of certainty: therefore it cannot certainly be known. Therefore if you will answer aright, show what foundation of certainty is found in future contingents, if you please to deny the Minor; or if you please to deny the Major, profess your mind plainly, and say, that That which hath no foundation of certainty in it self, may nevertheless be certainly known, which indeed is your course. For you profess plainly, that future contingents cannot be certainly known, of a sinite and imperfect knowledge, but they may be known by an infinite knowledge; such as is the knowledge of God.
So then the syllogisme corruptly interpreted by you, and the truth of it obscured by a preposterous distinction, take it in its proper vigour and force, is thus; That which in it selfe hath no foundation of certainty, cannot bee certainly knowne. But every future contingent hath in it selfe no foundation of certaintie: therefore it cannot certainly be knowne. Therefore if you will answer aright, shew what foundation of certainty is found in future contingents, if you please to deny the Minor; or if you please to deny the Major, professe your minde plainly, and say, that That which hath no foundation of certainty in it selfe, may neverthelesse be certainly knowne, which indeed is your course. For you professe plainly, that future contingents cannot bee certainly knowne, of a sinite and imperfect knowledge, but they may be knowne by an infinite knowledge; such as is the knowledge of God.
And thus you might have answered the former syllogism plainly, without the help of your former distinction, in this manner: That which is in it self uncertain, cannot be certainly known. It is true in respect of a finite knowledge, such as is the knowledge of man; but it is not true in respect of knowledge infinite, such as is the knowledge of God. But whereas you put it indifferent to answer by way of distinction, either of knowledge finite and infinite, or of knowledge fallible and infallible; herein you are very wide. For a very absurd issue would be of this latter distinction, after this manner: That which is uncertain in it self, cannot be certainly known by knowledge fallible, but it may be certainly known by knowledge infallible: which were as much as to says It cannot be certainly known by knowledge that may err in knowing it, but it may be certainly known by knowledge that cannot err in knowing it. And yet it will not serve your turn neither; For, though Gods knowledge be infallible, yet it will not follow that