A14095:800
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And thus you might have answered the former syllogism plainly, without the help of your former distinction, in this manner: That which is in it self uncertain, cannot be certainly known. It is true in respect of a finite knowledge, such as is the knowledge of man; but it is not true in respect of knowledge infinite, such as is the knowledge of God. But whereas you put it indifferent to answer by way of distinction, either of knowledge finite and infinite, or of knowledge fallible and infallible; herein you are very wide. For a very absurd issue would be of this latter distinction, after this manner: That which is uncertain in it self, cannot be certainly known by knowledge fallible, but it may be certainly known by knowledge infallible: which were as much as to says It cannot be certainly known by knowledge that may err in knowing it, but it may be certainly known by knowledge that cannot err in knowing it. And yet it will not serve your turn neither; For, though Gods knowledge be infallible, yet it will not follow that ⟨p. 320⟩God knows this infallibility; because, though he infallibly knows whatsoever he knows, yet perhaps this is a thing not knowable at all. for to know that such a thing certainly shall be, which in its own nature is no more certain to be than not to be, is not to know, but rather to err: and so the argument still holds good, 'and no way' answered by you, but boldly outfaced by a mere begging of that which is in question. Yet nothing possible shall be uncertain unto God, for he knows it to be possible, and that most certainly. But with what colour can you infer, that because it is possible to be, therefore God most certainly knows that it shall be? For, consider, is it not as well possible not to be? and may not I by the same liberty of argumentation, which you usurp unto your self, conclude, therefore God most certainly knows that it shall not be? In a word, things must be to come, before they can be known to be to come. But seeing future contingents are in their own nature only possible, and indifferent to be to come, or not to come; I pray consider by what activity or operation, they have passed from the condition of things possible, to the condition of things future? for if they have not passed into this condition, they are not as yet knowable to be future;
And thus you might have answered the former syllogisme plainly, without the helpe of your former distinction, in this manner: That which is in it selfe uncertaine, cannot bee certainly knowne. It is true in respect of a finite knowledge, such as is the knowledge of man; but it is not true in respect of knowledge infinite, such as is the knowledge of God. But whereas you put it indifferent to answer by way of distinction, either of knowledge finite and infinite, or of knowledge fallible and infallible; herein you are very wide. For a very absurd issue would be of this latter distinction, after this manner: That which is uncertaine in it selfe, cannot be certainly knowne by knowledge fallible, but it may be certainly knowne by knowledge infallible: which were as much as to says It cannot bee certainly knowne by knowledge that may erre in knowing it, but it may bee certainly knowne by knowledge that cannot erre in knowing it. And yet it will not serve your turne neither; For, though Gods knowledge bee infallible, yet it will not follow that