A14095:808
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
11. What you discourse of knowledge conjectural which man may have of things contingent, cannot have of things casual, I leave it as I find it, I come to the cause why we cannot foreknow future contingents, and this you say is because our essence, and knowledge are but finite; so that things contingent are not so contained in us, that if we could perfectly know our selves we might perfectly know them; Thus you are content to dictate at pleasure, without affording one mite of reason, for the establishing of your proselytes faith in this. As finite as our ⟨p. 323⟩knowledge is, we know contingents to be contingents. But to know that a thing merely contingent which denomination includes only a possibility of coming to pass, or not coming to pass, I say to know that such a thing shall come to pass, exceeds the reach of knowledge infinite. For infinite knowledge doth extend no farther than to things knowable. But, for a contingent, which both in his own nature, and from without doth yet continue indifferent to be or not to be, is not a thing, at all knowable, that it shall come to pass. For it must be a thing future, before it can be known to be future. But the contingents, you speak of, are supposed both in their own nature to be only possible, that is indifferent to be or not be, and as yet determined by no outward agent to be. In which case they still continue under the condition of things nearly possible. And so far they are knowable, and no farther. And accordingly so far they are ind•ed known by God, by that knowledge which is commonly called Scientia simplicis intelligentiae. But the knowledge of things future is called Scientia visionis. And things merely possible, till some determination doth come unto them from without, are not as yet future, and consequently cannot be known, to be future, yet notwithstanding you are bold to say, that In the divine essence, all real effects, all events possible, whether necessary, casual or contingent, are eminently contained; The perfect knowledge of his own essence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge, not only of all things, that have been, are, or shall be, but of all things that might have been, or possibly may be. A most ridiculous amplification? For it is as much, as to say, that God knows not only all contingent truths, but all necessary truths also.
11. What you discourse of knowledge conjecturall which man may have of things contingent, cannot have of things casuall, I leave it as I find it, I come to the cause why we cannot foreknow future contingents, and this you say is because our essence, and knowledge are but finite; so that things contingent are not so conteined in us, that if we could perfectly know our selfes we might perfectly know them; Thus you are content to dictate at pleasure, without affoording one mite of reason, for the establishing of your proselytes faith in this. As finite as our