A14095:824
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But whereas you touch by the way that things to come to us are only to come, thereby you imply one of your well known paradoxes, that things to come are not only to come unto God; the meaning is, that they are not only to come to him, but present to him also. It is enough for you to dictate mysteries. By the same proportion of truth, things past, which are only past to us, are not so only to him, but unto him they are not only past, but present also; this is good hobgoblin stuff, whether you count it Philosophy or Divinity. ⟨p. 331⟩In the next place you tell us that For us to apprehend a thing past as contingent, is not impossible. About the coherence I will not question you; you take liberty to discourse at pleasure. In the very next page you say that it is in our power to make a thing necessary to morrow, which is truly contingent this day. As I take it, it proceeds in congruity to that Maxime, Quicquid est quando est necesse est esse. And therefore if once I do that which is in my power to do, when I once have done it, it is necessary, whereas before it was contingent. […] on the contrary you will have it not impossible to apprehend a thing as contingent after it is done and past, whereas this was wont to be held impossible to God himself to make undone that which was already done. In a word it is held flat contradiction. For to be contingent is to be indifferent to be or not to be. But that which is, neither is nor possibly can be indifferent to be or not to be. Yet herehence it followeth not, that it came to pass necessarily there is no colour for any such inference. For what? doth nothing come to pass but necessarily? but whether it comes to pass necessarily or contingently, being once come to pass the contingency of it is at an end, and past irrecoverably. For it is no longer indifferent to be or not to be. And your caution is very idle that you put in, lest upon the passing of a contingent thing we should conceive it to come to pass necessarily. Yet notwithstanding that which comes to pass contingently in respect of the manner of existence, may of necessity come to pass upon supposition of Gods decree, as the calling of the Jews, the destruction of Antichrist which we look for.
But whereas you touch by the way that things to come to us are onely to come, thereby you imply one of your well known paradoxes, that things to come are not onely to come unto God; the meaning is, that they are not onely to come to him, but present to him also. It is enough for you to dictate mysteries. By the same proportion of truth, things past, which are onely past to us, are not so onely to him, but unto him they are not onely past, but present also; this is good hobgoblin stuffe, whether you count it Philosophy or Divinity.