A14095:826
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Again, though they come to pass contingently, yet why should you deny, or would not have us conceive that they fall out certainly? though uncertainly to man, yet undoubtedly whatsoever comes to pass, comes to pass most certainly unto ⟨p. 332⟩God: yet no doubt but the production of it was contingent, yea and sometimes casual in respect of second causes. The event is not necessary in respect of the manner of producing it. But being produced, now it must needs be produced, and it is impossible it should be otherwise.
Againe, though they come to passe contingently, yet why should you deny, or would not have us conceive that they fal out certainly? though uncertainly to man, yet undoubtedly whatsoever comes to passe, comes to passe most certainly unto ⟨p. 332⟩God: yet no doubt but the production of it was contingent, yea and sometimes casuall in respect of second causes. The event is not necessary in respect of the manner of producing it. But being produced, now it must needs be produced, and it is impossible it should be otherwise.
Neither doth our knowledge of any thing change the nature of it. Neither is our knowledge necessary (though you say so) of things past or present but merely contingent in the generation thereof also; Though as of all other contingents, so of our knowledge also, it is true that when once it is, it is impossible it should not be, or not have been at all. In a word upon the existence thereof, the indifferency thereof, to be or not be, is utterly vanished. But herhence to infer the like, not of Gods foreknowledge only but of his decrees also, is a very wild inference. Yet we willingly grant that Gods knowledge of things doth no way alter the nature of them, or of the manner of their existence. No nor his decree neither. For though he decreed to make the World, yet the World we say came to pass never a whit the less contingently. And though God hath decreed the fall of Antichrist, and that Babylon shall be burnt with fire: yet these shall come to pass never a whit the less contingently. For God decrees not only res ipsas, but modus rerum, to wit that some things shall come to pass necessarily, and somethings contingently. And so the effectual will of God in Aquinas his judgement is the rate of all contingency. But yet notwithstanding even from the foreknowledge of God there riseth a necessity of consequence as thus: If God foreknows such a thing shall come to pass, then it is necessary it shall come to pass, though perhaps he knows it shall come to pass not necessarily but contingently. How much more doth such a necessity arise from the decree of God as thus. If God hath decreed the World should have an end, it is necessary the World should have an end, yet not necessarily but contingently. For as God did work freely in making the World, so shall he work as freely in setting an end unto it. So far are we from saying that Gods decrees take away contingency